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SYMPOSIUM: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN  
DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW  
 
THE FUTURE OF DISABILITY RIGHTS  
PROTECTIONS FOR TRANSGENDER PEOPLE 
Kevin M. Barry & Jennifer L. Levi* 
The Americans with Disabilities Act and its predecessor, 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 504”), protect 
people from discrimination based on disability, but not if that disability 
happens to be one of three archaic medical conditions associated with 
transgender people: “transvestism,” “transsexualism,” and “gender 
identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments.”1  This 
Article tells the story of how this transgender exclusion came to be, 
why a growing number of federal courts say it does not apply to gender 
dysphoria, a new and distinct medical diagnosis, and the future of 
disability rights protections for transgender people.   
 
* Kevin M. Barry, Professor of Law, Quinnipiac University School of Law & Jennifer L. Levi, 
Professor of Law, Western New England University School of Law.  This Article is the third 
in a series of articles tracing the development of disability rights protection for gender 
dysphoria.  For further information on this topic, see the following articles by the authors: 
Kevin M. Barry et al., A Bare Desire to Harm: Transgender People and the Equal Protection 
Clause, 57 B.C. L. REV. 507 (2016), and Kevin Barry & Jennifer Levi, Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, 
Inc. and a New Path for Transgender Rights, 127 YALE L.J.F. 373 (2017).  For other 
foundational articles on this topic, see Christine Michelle Duffy, The Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, in GENDER IDENTITY AND SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE ch. 16 (2014); 
Jennifer L. Levi & Bennett H. Klein, Pursuing Protection for Transgender People Through 
Disability Laws, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 74-92 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006); Kevin M. 
Barry, Disabilityqueer: Federal Disability Rights Protection for Transgender People, 16 
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1 (2013); Jennifer L. Levi, Clothes Don’t Make the Man (or 
Woman), but Gender Identity Might, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 90 (2006).  Thanks to 
participants at the SEALS 2018 Conference Workshop on Labor and Employment Law for 
helpful conversations; to Michael Morales and Touro Law Review staff for editorial 
assistance; and to Tina DeLucia, Carmel Joseph, and Jeff Kaplan for research assistance. 
1 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1) (2018); 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(F) (2018). 
26 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 35 
Part I sketches the “matrix” of discrimination that the ADA and 
Section 504 were intended to redress: prejudice, stereotypes, and 
societal neglect.  Part II briefly discusses the discrimination that people 
with gender dysphoria—a quintessentially stigmatizing condition—
routinely experience.  Part III traces the history of the transgender 
exclusion, from its inception three decades ago to its recent decline in 
the district courts.  Part IV collects every reported case to have alleged 
gender dysphoria discrimination under the ADA and Section 504 since 
2015—ranging from employment discrimination to prisoners’ rights to 
access to insurance and identity documents—and discusses the 
potential impact of these cases in redressing the prejudice, stereotypes, 
and societal neglect experienced by people with gender dysphoria.  
Part V offers some concluding remarks. 
I. A DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION MATRIX 
Throughout much of American history, people with disabilities 
have experienced systemic discrimination, namely prejudice (animus-
based attitudes), stereotypes (overbroad generalizations), and neglect 
(historical exclusion).2  They have been hated, stereotyped, and 
ignored.  Such discrimination is especially pronounced for those whose 
medical conditions are stigmatized—those who have been typed as 
“abnormal or defective in mind or body” because they “differ too much 
from a socially defined ‘norm.’”3 
For many years, government policy toward people with 
disabilities did not address discrimination; instead, it focused almost 
exclusively on vocational rehabilitation designed to help people with 
disabilities overcome their limitations, and on benefits entitlement 
 
2 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability”, 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 
422-26 (2000); see also ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a)(2), 122 
Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12113) (“[I]n enacting the ADA, Congress 
recognized that . . . people with physical or mental disabilities are frequently precluded from 
[fully participating in all aspects of society] because of prejudice, antiquated attitudes, or the 
failure to remove societal and institutional barriers.”). 
3 See Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 437 (“[P]eople who differ too much from a socially defined 
‘norm’ are likely to experience all [three types of discrimination]”—i.e., prejudice, 
stereotypes, and neglect); see also Carol J. Gill, Questioning Continuum, in THE RAGGED 
EDGE: THE DISABILITY EXPERIENCE FROM THE PAGES OF THE FIRST FIFTEEN YEARS OF THE 
DISABILITY RAG 42, 44 (Barrett Shaw ed., 1994) (“[D]isability is a marginalized status that 
society assigns to people who are different enough from majority cultural standards to be 
judged abnormal or defective in mind or body.”). 
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programs.4  Beginning in the 1970’s, government policy toward people 
with disabilities radically changed with the emergence of the disability 
rights movement, which reframed disability as primarily a social 
condition.5  According to the “social model” of disability, people are 
“disabled” not by the functional limitations imposed by their medical 
conditions, but rather by society’s discriminatory reactions—
prejudice, stereotypes, and neglect—toward those conditions.6  
Barriers to full participation for people with disabilities, the model 
holds, lay not with the individual, but rather with society’s unfair 
treatment of the individual.7 
As depicted in the diagram below, the ADA and its 
predecessor, Section 504, embody this understanding.  They prohibit 
policies and practices that “disable”—that perpetuate prejudice, 
stereotypes, and neglect based on medical conditions.8 
 
4 See Jennifer L. Levi & Bennett H. Klein, Pursuing Protection for Transgender People 
Through Disability Laws, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 78 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006); see 
also Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: 
What Happened?—Why?—And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
91, 96 (2000) (stating that rehabilitation laws “presumed . . . that integration required changing 
the person with the disability, not changing any aspect of the surrounding society that might 
have made it difficult for the person to function in that society”). 
5 See Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 427-30. 
6 See Mary Crossley, Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 654 (1999) 
(“[T]he disadvantaged status of persons with disabilities is the product of a hostile (or at least 
inhospitable) social environment, not simply the product of bodily defects.”); see also H.R. 
REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 41 (1990) (House Committee on Education & Labor) (“The social 
consequences that have attached to being disabled often bear no relationship to the physical or 
mental limitations imposed by the disability.  For example, being paralyzed has meant far 
more than being unable to walk—it has meant being excluded from public schools, being 
denied employment opportunities, and being deemed an ‘unfit parent.’” (quoting testimony of 
Arlene Mayerson of the Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund)).   
7 See Kevin Barry, Towards Universalism: What the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Can 
and Can’t Do for Disability Rights, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 203, 212 (2010) (“Under 
the social model, then, disability is not a problem with the individual—it is a problem with our 
response to the individual.”). 
8 Although it is useful for analytical purposes to think of these three types of discrimination 
as being distinct from each other, there is, of course, much overlap among them.  Stereotypes, 
for example, may be fueled by animus, not ignorance or indifference; and neglect may be 
driven by overbroad generalizations about the capacities of certain people.   
28 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 35 
 
The ADA’s text and legislative history confirm this protection from 
prejudice, stereotypes, and neglect, as do Supreme Court decisions 
interpreting the ADA and Section 504.9 
A. Prejudice 
First consider prejudice.  The ADA’s antidiscrimination 
provisions expressly target animus-based conduct by prohibiting 
disparate treatment—intentionally discriminatory actions—such as 
categorical exclusion or segregation of people with particular medical 
conditions.10  The ADA’s findings acknowledge the persistent and 
pervasive history of “unfair . . . prejudice” against people with 
disabilities,11 as does the ADA’s legislative history, which is replete 
with appalling instances of such prejudice.  Examples include a New 
Jersey zoo keeper who refused to admit children with Down’s 
Syndrome because he feared they would upset the chimpanzees, 
operators of an auction house who attempted to remove a woman with 
polio because she was deemed to be “disgusting to look at,” a woman 
with arthritis who was denied a job at a college because the college 
trustees believed that “normal students shouldn’t see her,” and a child 
with cerebral palsy who was excluded from public school because his 
 
9 Given Section 504’s lack of legislative history, see, e.g., Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 
287, 295 n.13 (1985) (noting lack of congressional debate devoted to Section 504), and its 
nearly identical language to the ADA, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (requiring the ADA to 
be construed consistently with Section 504), this Essay’s discussion of legislative history and 
text focuses on the ADA, not Section 504. 
10 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1)-(2), (b)(4) (2018) (Title I); id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)-(C) 
(Title III); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)-(2), (d) (2018) (DOJ regulations implementing Title II). 
11 42 U.S.C. § 12101(5)-(6), (8) (finding that people with disabilities experience 
“prejudice,” “outright intentional exclusion,” and “segregation,” and “occupy an inferior 
status”); see also ADA Amendments Act of 2008 , Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a)(2), 122 Stat. 
3553 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12113) (discussing “prejudice” against people 
with physical and mental disabilities). 
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teacher claimed that his physical appearance “produced a nauseating 
effect” on his classmates.12  
Supreme Court case law underscores the ADA’s and Section 
504’s protection of people who have experienced prejudice based on a 
medical condition.  In Alexander v. Choate, the Court located the roots 
of Section 504, in part, in the “well-catalogued instances of invidious 
discrimination” against people with disabilities.13  And in his 
concurring opinion several years earlier in City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Center, a case in which the Court invalidated a zoning 
ordinance that discriminated against people with intellectual 
disabilities in violation of equal protection, Justice Thurgood Marshall 
vividly recounted this history of prejudice.14  People with intellectual 
disabilities, he explained, “have been subject to a ‘lengthy and tragic 
history’ . . . of segregation and discrimination that can only be called 
grotesque”—a “regime of state-mandated segregation and degradation 
. . . that in its virulence and bigotry rivaled, and indeed paralleled, the 
worst excesses of Jim Crow.”15  Widely considered to be a “menace to 
society and civilization,” people with intellectual disabilities were 
housed in “[m]assive custodial institutions” designed to “halt [their] 
reproduction” and “extinguish their race.”16 
B. Stereotypes 
Beyond prejudice, the ADA targets conduct based on 
stereotypical assumptions.  The ADA’s antidiscrimination provisions 
 
12 Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications 
of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 418-19 (1991). 
13 469 U.S. 287, 295 n.12 (1985).  
14 See 473 U.S. 432, 435 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
15 Id. at 461-62 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
16 Id. at 462.  Because Cleburne’s facts centered on people with intellectual disabilities, 
Justice Marshall’s stirring portrait of discrimination did not include other forms of state-
sanctioned discrimination against people with disabilities, including the institutionalization of 
people with a range of conditions other than intellectual disabilities, such as epilepsy and 
blindness; the passage of state “ugly laws” that prohibited “unsightly” people—including 
people with disabilities—from appearing in public; and a built environment that excluded 
people with disabilities, quite literally, at every step—from the sidewalks encircling their 
homes to the stairs leading up to the U.S. Capitol.  See Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 440-41; see 
also NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY: THE MAKING OF THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 113 (1997), https://ncd.gov/publications/2010/equality_of 
_Opportunity_The_Making_of_the_Americans_with_Disabilities_Act [hereinafter EQUALITY 
OF OPPORTUNITY] (describing Capitol steps as “a symbol of discrimination against the 
disabled” (quoting Michael Auberger, co-founder of ADAPT)). 
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prohibit overbroad rules and qualification standards that have a 
disparate impact—a “discriminatory effect”—on people with medical 
conditions, screening them out from opportunities enjoyed by those 
without a medical condition.17  The ADA’s findings recognize the 
pernicious role that “overprotective rules and policies,” “exclusionary 
qualification standards and criteria,” and “antiquated attitudes” have 
had in denying people with medical conditions equal opportunity.18  
And the ADA’s legislative history contains numerous examples of 
disgraceful actions taken against people with disabilities based on 
“false presumptions, generalizations, misperceptions, patronizing 
attitudes, ignorance, irrational fears, and pernicious mythologies,”19 
including: a man with AIDS who was forced by police to remain in his 
car overnight as neighbors peered at him through the car’s windows; a 
woman who was fired from a job she had held for many years because 
her son, who lived with her, had contracted AIDS; people with epilepsy 
who were believed to be possessed by the devil and shut out of schools 
and the workforce; a woman with HIV whose use of a community 
swimming pool led the town to close the pool for a week and prompted 
a neighbor to start a petition demanding that she move out of the town; 
and fully-registered people with disabilities who were turned away 
 
17 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3), (b)(6) (2018) (Title I); id. § 12182(b)(1)(D), 
(b)(2)(A)(i) (Title III); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(3), (b)(8) (2018) (DOJ regulations implementing 
Title II). 
18 42 U.S.C. § 12101(5); ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a)(2), 
122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12113); see also Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(a)(7) (1990) (finding that people with 
disabilities have been subjected to discrimination based, in part, on “stereotypic assumptions 
. . . not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in and 
contribute to society”) (removed from ADA by 2008 amendments). 
19 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 30 (1990); see also id. at 40 (discussing “stereotypical 
assumptions, fears and myths [about people with disabilities] not truly indicative of the ability 
of such individuals to participate in and contribute to society”); accord S. REP. NO. 101-116, 
at 6 (1989), https://transition.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OSEC/library/legislative_histories/1387.pdf 
(Senate Committee of Labor and Human Resources).  According to Senator Tom Harkin:  
There is a wellspring of fears and unfounded prejudices about people with 
disabilities, unfounded fears, whether people have mental disorders, 
whether they are manic depressives or schizophrenia or paranoia, or 
unfounded fears and prejudices based upon physical disabilities. The point 
of the [ADA] is to start breaking down those barriers of fear and prejudice 
and unfounded fears, to get past that point so that people begin to look at 
people based on their abilities, not first looking at their disability. 
135 CONG. REC. S10765-01, S10768, 1989 WL 183216 (Sept. 6, 1989) (statement of Sen. 
Harkin). 
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from voting booths because they did not look sufficiently “competent” 
to vote.20 
Numerous Supreme Court decisions support the ADA’s and 
Section 504’s mandate to address harmful stereotypes.  In 1987, in 
School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,21 the Supreme Court 
concluded that Section 504 protected a school teacher with 
tuberculosis who was discharged from her job because of others’ fears 
that she might be contagious.22  “[T]he basic purpose of § 504,” the 
Court concluded, “is to ensure that handicapped individuals are not 
denied jobs or other benefits because of the prejudiced attitudes or the 
ignorance of others”—including “society’s accumulated myths and 
fears about disability and disease.”23  “[D]iscrimination on the basis of 
mythology,” the Court explained, “[is] precisely the type of injury 
Congress sought to prevent.”24  Negative stereotypical reactions, 
themselves, disable. 
Arline’s observations concerning society’s “accumulated 
myths and fears” about disability also find expression in Justice 
Thurgood Marshall’s concurrence in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center.  According to Justice Marshall, people with intellectual 
disabilities were “categorically excluded from public schools, based 
on the false stereotype that all were ineducable and on the purported 
need to protect [non-disabled] children from them.”25  State laws 
deemed them unfit for citizenship, disqualified them from voting, 
compelled their sterilization to stop them from procreating, and made 
their marriages voidable and even criminal.26  Although much has 
changed for people with intellectual disabilities, Justice Marshall 
explained, this long history of “social and cultural isolation” has 
resulted in “ignorance, irrational fears, and stereotyping” that continue 
to endure—“stymie[ing] recognition of the[ir] dignity and 
individuality.”27 
 
20 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 56-57; 136 CONG. REC. S7422-03, S7444, 1990 WL 
144937 (June 6, 1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin); EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY, supra note 16; 
accord S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 5-7.  
21 480 U.S. 273 (1987). 
22 Id. at 281.   
23 Id. at 284; see also id. at 283 (stating that the ADA covers those who experience “negative 
reactions . . . to the impairment”). 
24 Id. at 285. 
25 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 462-63 (1985).   
26 Id. at 463-64.   
27 Id. at 464, 467. 
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Subsequent Supreme Court decisions confirm the law’s 
protection of people with medical conditions from harmful 
stereotypes.  In Bragdon v. Abbott,28 the Court held that the ADA’s 
definition of “disability” covered a woman with HIV whose dentist 
refused to render services out of fear of infection—a position shared 
by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and every other agency and court 
that had considered the issue under Section 504.29  In Olmstead v. L.C. 
ex rel. Zimring,30 the Court held that unnecessary institutionalization 
of people with various mental impairments violated the ADA, in part, 
because it “stigmatiz[ed]” them, “perpetuat[ing] unwarranted 
assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable or unworthy of 
participating in community life.”31  And in Board of Trustees of the 
University of Alabama v. Garrett,32 Justice Kennedy observed that the 
ADA prohibits actions based not on “malice or hostile animus alone,” 
but also 
insensitivity caused by simple want of careful, rational 
reflection or from some instinctive mechanism to guard 
against people who appear to be different in some 
respects from ourselves. Quite apart from any historical 
documentation, knowledge of our own human instincts 
teaches that persons who find it difficult to perform 
routine functions by reason of some mental or physical 
impairment might at first seem unsettling to us, unless 
we are guided by the better angels of our nature.33  
C. Societal Neglect 
Lastly, the ADA targets the neglect of people with disabilities, 
whose “[e]xclusion is literally built into our physical and social 
environment.”34  Take, for example, buildings inaccessible to people 
who use wheelchairs, workplaces that do not permit job coaches for 
people with mental health conditions, and paper money 
indistinguishable to a person who is blind.  Throughout history, these 
 
28 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
29 Id. at 628-29, 642-45. 
30 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
31 Id. at 600 (citation omitted). 
32 531 U.S. 356 (2001). 
33 Id. at 374-75 (Kennedy & O’Connor, JJ., concurring). 
34 Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 425. 
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“[societal] norms have arisen out of the cumulative set of actions and 
decisions” taken by members of the majority—“with any 
disadvantages resulting to other members of society largely ignored 
and unacknowledged.”35   
The ADA’s antidiscrimination provisions address society’s 
historical neglect of people with disabilities by requiring universal 
design and the removal of architectural barriers,36 reasonable 
accommodations in the workplace,37 and reasonable modification of 
policies, practices, and procedures in government and private 
business.38  The ADA’s findings likewise acknowledge the 
“isolat[ion]” and “inferior status” of people with disabilities, their 
“relegation to lesser services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or 
other opportunities,” and society’s “failure to make modifications to 
existing facilities and practices” and to “remove societal and 
institutional barriers.”39 
Societal neglect of people with disabilities also features in the 
ADA’s and Section 504’s legislative history, as well as in Supreme 
Court decisions interpreting these laws.  According to one of the 
ADA’s lead sponsors, Senator Tom Harkin, the ADA “offers promise 
that [people with disabilities] will no longer be shunned and isolated 
because of the ignorance of others.”40  Rather, according to President 
George H.W. Bush, who signed the ADA into law, people with 
disabilities will have “the opportunity to blend fully and equally into 
the rich mosaic of the American mainstream.”41  As the Supreme Court 
stated in Alexander, Congress viewed discrimination against people 
with disabilities as “most often the product, not of invidious animus, 
but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference—of benign neglect,” 
 
35 Chai R. Feldblum, Rectifying the Tilt: Equality Lessons From Religion, Disability, Sexual 
Orientation, and Transgender, 54 ME. L. REV. 159, 182 (2002); see also id. at 181 
(“Admittedly, these decisions were not taken out of malice or hatred for minority members of 
society.”). 
36 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)-(v), 12183 (2018) (Title III); 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.150, 
35.151 (2018) (DOJ regulations implementing Title II). 
37 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (Title I). 
38 See id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii) (Title III); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (DOJ regulations 
implementing Title II). 
39 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(2), (5); ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 
2(a)(2), 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12113). 
40 136 CONG. REC. S7422-03, S7444, 1990 WL 144937 (June 6, 1990) (statement of Sen. 
Harkin). 
41 Remarks of President George Bush at the Signing of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/videos/ada_signing_text.html (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2018). 
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“apathetic attitudes,” and “shameful oversight[].”42  Section 504, the 
Alexander Court stated, was intended to remedy the “invisibility of 
[people with disabilities] in America,” who were forced “to live among 
society ‘shunted aside, hidden, and ignored.’”43  Justices Kennedy and 
Ginsburg have likewise discussed the “indifference” toward people 
with disabilities and “systematic exclusion” that motivated passage of 
the ADA.44 
II. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH GENDER 
DYSPHORIA 
Gender dysphoria is a rare but serious medical condition 
characterized by a marked incongruence between one’s assigned sex 
at birth and one’s gender identity, which results in clinically significant 
distress.45  Without treatment, adults with gender dysphoria experience 
serious psychological debilitation (e.g., anxiety, depression, suicidality 
and other mental health issues).46  Fortunately, gender dysphoria is 
curable by medically-recommended and supervised gender transition, 
which alleviates the distress caused by gender dysphoria and allows 
one to live a life consistent with one’s gender identity.  The medical 
care for the condition is individualized and consists of one or more of 
four components: living consistent with one’s gender; hormone 
therapy to bring a person’s body into conformity with their gender 
identity; surgery to change primary and/or secondary sex 
characteristics; and psychotherapy.47  
People with gender dysphoria routinely face discrimination 
based on their medical condition and the medical services and 
treatments they use to treat it.  Specifically, they are subject to 
relentless prejudice, in the form of animus-driven exclusion and 
segregation; stereotypical assumptions, fears, and pernicious myths, in 
 
42 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295-96 (1985). 
43 Id. at 296 (quoting 117 CONG. REC. 45974 (1971)). 
44 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 536 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Bd. of Trs. v. 
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 375 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
45 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS 452, 454 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5]. 
46 See id. at 454-55. 
47 WORLD PROF. ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR THE HEALTH 
OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND GENDER NONCONFORMING PEOPLE 9-10 (7th ed. 2011), 
https://www.wpath.org/media/cms/Documents/Web%20Transfer/SOC/Standards%20of%20
Care%20V7%20-%202011%20WPATH.pdf [hereinafter SOC].  
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the form of overbroad rules and qualification standards that screen 
them out; and neglect, in the form of refusals to modify policies to 
permit equal participation.  Indeed, gender dysphoria is a 
quintessentially stigmatizing medical condition—one that is subject to 
pervasive and persistent discrimination because those with the 
condition are “not considered to be among the ‘normals’ for whom 
society, and its institutions, are designed.”48 
According to the American Psychiatric Association, gender 
dysphoria: 
is associated with high levels of stigmatization, 
discrimination, and victimization, leading to negative 
self-concept, increased rates of mental disorder 
comorbidity, school dropout, and economic 
marginalization, including unemployment, with 
attendant social and mental health risks, especially in 
individuals from resource-poor family backgrounds.49 
The internationally accepted Standards of Care for the treatment of 
gender dysphoria, published by the World Professional Association for 
Transgender Health (“WPATH”), similarly recognize the risk of 
“abuse and stigmatization” of people with gender dysphoria.50 
Gender dysphoria’s close association with transgender 
people—an “historically persecuted and politically powerless” class 
who “face discrimination, harassment, and violence because of their 
gender identity”—likewise contributes to the discrimination faced by 
people with gender dysphoria.51  Take, for example, the experience of 
Gavin Grimm and Ash Whitaker, both transgender students, who were 
 
48 See Bagenstos, supra note 2, at 437; see also Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 324 (11th Cir. 
1992) (noting “the social stigma attached” to “transsexuality”); Lie v. Sky Publ’g Corp., 2002 
WL 31492397, at *7 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 7, 2002) (denying employer’s motion for summary 
judgment under Massachusetts’ ADA-like, three-pronged definition of disability, and stating 
that “[i]t cannot be gainsaid that transsexuals have a classically stigmatizing condition that 
sometimes elicits reactions based solely on prejudices, stereotypes, or unfounded fear”). 
49 DSM-5, supra note 45, at 458.   
50 See SOC, supra note 47, at 21. 
51 Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 
1034, 1051 (7th Cir. 2017); Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 176 (2017); see generally 
NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, THE REPORT OF THE 2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER 
SURVEY 4 (2016), https://www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/USTS-Full-Report-
FINAL.PDF (surveying nearly 28,000 transgender people and concluding that they are 
disproportionately at risk for discrimination in almost all aspects of life, including 
employment, housing, education, public accommodations, and access to government 
services). 
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told by their high school principals that they could not use gender-
appropriate restrooms because it would violate “the dignity and 
privacy rights of other students” and would create “safety issues and 
lewdness concerns.”52  Consider also the experience of current and 
aspiring transgender military service members who were told by the 
President of the United States that they were no longer welcome in the 
military because they were a “burden[]” and a “disruption.”53  Or 
consider state and local laws that once criminalized cross-dressing in 
public “to prevent crimes in washrooms; and . . . to prevent inherently 
antisocial conduct which is contrary to the accepted norms of our 
society.”54 
Notwithstanding the discrimination routinely experienced by 
people with gender dysphoria, few litigants with gender dysphoria 
have claimed the protection of the ADA and Section 504.  Part III 
explains why this is so, and why this is now changing. 
III. THE HISTORY OF THE TRANSGENDER EXCLUSION 
The history of the ADA’s and Section 504’s transgender 
exclusion begins in the late 1980’s with the successful legislative 
efforts of several conservative senior U.S. senators, who sought to strip 
legal protections for medical conditions closely associated with 
transgender people.  Approximately twenty-five years later, the 
pendulum has swung, as transgender litigants with the new and distinct 
diagnosis of gender dysphoria successfully claim the protection of the 
ADA and Section 504. 
A. The Making of the Transgender Exclusion: 1987-
1990 
The ADA’s predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act, originally 
protected people with transgender-related diagnoses from 
discrimination, as demonstrated by a pair of federal district court cases 
from the mid-1980’s.  In Doe v. United States Postal Service,55 the U.S. 
Postal Service revoked a transgender woman’s conditional job offer 
 
52 Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 
850, 874 (S.D. Ohio 2016); accord Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1052. 
53 Doe 1, 275 F. Supp. 3d at 183. 
54 City of Chicago v. Wilson, 389 N.E.2d 522, 524 (Ill. 1978); Doe 1 v. McConn, 489 F. 
Supp. 76, 80 (S.D. Tex. 1980). 
55 Civ. A. No. 84-3296, 1985 WL 9446 (D.D.C. June 12, 1985). 
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after she disclosed her intent to undergo gender reassignment 
surgery.56  Describing the case as a “sad” one, the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia denied the United States Postal 
Service’s motion to dismiss and held that the plaintiff, who had a 
“medically and psychologically established need for gender 
reassignment surgery,” had stated a claim for disability discrimination 
under the Rehabilitation Act.57 
Similarly, in Blackwell v. United States Department of the 
Treasury,58 a Treasury Department supervisor canceled a job vacancy 
just hours after interviewing the plaintiff, a transgender woman, 
notwithstanding her priority hiring credentials (she had worked for 
nearly ten years in other branches of the Treasury Department and had 
been laid off due to a reduction in force) and the recommendation of 
an experienced, competent interviewer that the plaintiff be hired.59  
According to the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia, the Treasury Department’s actions were “highly 
reprehensible”; the Department supervisor “knew [the] plaintiff could 
 
56 Id. at *2-3. 
57 Id. at *1.  At the time the Doe v. USPS case was decided, “transsexualism” was used by 
medical and non-medical communities interchangeably with the diagnosis of GID.  Compare 
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 261-66 (3rd ed. 1980) [hereinafter DSM-3] (using “transsexualism” to refer to the 
diagnosis of GID in adults and adolescents; children with GID received a diagnosis of “GID 
of Childhood”), with Christine Michelle Duffy, The Americans with Disabilities Act of1990 
and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, in GENDER IDENTITY AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION 
DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 16-48 (2014) (“It was not 
uncommon at the time [the ADA was being debated] for people to use the terms 
‘transsexualism’ and ‘GID’ interchangeably.”).  Transsexualism was removed from the DSM 
in 1994 and is no longer identified as a medical condition in the DSM.  See AMERICAN 
PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 
532-38 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV] (combining the diagnoses of “Transsexualism” 
and “GID of Childhood” into the single diagnosis of “GID in children and in adolescents or 
adults”).  The International Classification of Diseases (“ICD”), published by the World Health 
Organization, has traced a similar path, originally using “transsexualism” to refer to the 
diagnosis of GID in adults and adolescents, and later substituting “gender incongruence” for 
“transsexualism” in the most current edition of the ICD, the ICD-11, published in June 2018.  
ICD-11 FOR MORTALITY AND MORBIDITY STATISTICS, GENDER INCONGRUENCE (Dec. 2018), 
https://icd.who.int/browse11/l-m/en#/http%3a%2f%2fid.who.int%2ficd%2fentity%2f411470 
068; see Jack Drescher et al., Minding the Body: Situating Gender Identity Diagnoses in the 
ICD-11, 24 INT’L REV. PSYCHIATRY 568, 568-69 (2012) (providing history of gender identity 
diagnostic classification).  The word “transsexual” is fading out of general use, but it describes 
a person who has or will undergo gender transition and it has been used interchangeably with 
the word transgender.  See DSM-5, supra note 45, at 451. 
58 656 F. Supp. 713 (D.D.C. 1986), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 830 F.2d 
1183 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
59 Id. at 714-15. 
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do the job and had no sound basis for even refusing to accept him for 
the job.”60  Following a bench trial, the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia concluded that the plaintiff had a medical 
condition that was protected under the Rehabilitation Act,61 but 
ultimately ruled against the plaintiff because she had not shown that 
she was refused hire on that basis.62 
Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) objected to courts’ recognition of 
transgender-related medical diagnoses as protected disabilities under 
the Rehabilitation Act on moral grounds.  In 1987, during Senate 
debate on a bill to override President Ronald Reagan’s veto of the Civil 
Rights Restoration Act—which expanded the scope of coverage of the 
Rehabilitation Act and several other federal antidiscrimination 
statutes—Helms cited the Blackwell case in an attempt to defeat the 
override.63  According to Helms, civil rights laws should not prohibit 
private institutions [that receive federal financial 
assistance], particularly schools and day care centers, . 
. . from making employment decisions based on moral 
qualifications. . . . [T]his bill opens the way for private 
institutions all over the country to find themselves 
forced to justify exclusion of various behaviorally 
handicapped persons from benefits by evidence from 
 
60 Id. at 715.  
61 Id. (using the language of “transvesti[sm]” to refer to the plaintiff).  “Transvestite” and 
“transvestism” are derogatory terms that were often used historically to refer to transgender 
people.  See HR Compl. ¶ 185, Tips for Managing GLBT in the Workplace, 2015 WL 8495422; 
see generally Dallas Denny, Transgender Communities, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 184 (2006) 
(distinguishing “transgender” from labels such as “transvestite” that were “bestowed by the 
medical community and are in a sense slave names”).  At the time of the Blackwell case, these 
words were used by non-medical communities interchangeably with “transsexual” and 
“transsexualism.”  It is clear from the facts of Blackwell that the plaintiff had undergone gender 
transition and was transgender.  According to the court, in addition to dressing in female attire, 
the plaintiff “had foam implanted in h[er] breasts, and ha[d] effected other changes in h[er] 
physical appearance,” including “female dress and adornments.”  Blackwell, 656 F. Supp. at 
714. 
62 The court held that the plaintiff was fired not because of a transgender-related medical 
condition, but rather because of her sexual orientation.  Id. at 715 (stating that the Department 
supervisor “found plaintiff’s apparent homosexual aspect undesirable and changed the rules 
to avoid the inevitable administrative hassle that would occur if he declined a qualified 
applicant who was carrying priority hiring credentials because of the RIF.”). 
63 See Ruth Colker, Homophobia, AIDS Hysteria, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
8 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 33, 37-39 (2004) (discussing legislative history of Civil Rights 
Restoration Act of 1987). 
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medical doctors and other experts, but not from morals 
or theology.64 
Although Helms lost this argument when Congress passed the 
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 over the President’s veto, he 
returned to the issue the following year.  In 1988, during Senate debate 
on a bill to amend the Fair Housing Act to prohibit housing 
discrimination based on disability status, Helms successfully argued 
for the bill’s exclusion of protection of conditions associated with 
being transgender.65  After reciting the facts and holding of the 
Blackwell case, in which the court recognized Section 504’s protection 
of people with transgender-related medical conditions, Helms quipped 
that his amendment would “put a little common sense back into the 
equation.”66  The amendment, which excluded transgender-related 
medical conditions from both the Fair Housing Act and Section 504, 
passed overwhelmingly.67 
Senator Alan Cranston, a principal author of Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act and one of only two senators to oppose the Helms 
amendment, rose in objection.68  Cranston argued that the Helms 
amendment was fueled by moral animus against transgender people 
and was at odds with the purpose of the law.  “I see this amendment,” 
he stated, 
as a direct attack on the heart and soul of 
antidiscrimination laws, which protect individuals 
against discrimination based on stereotypes.   
In 1973 when section 504 was enacted, Congress 
recognized that a great deal of the discrimination facing 
disabled individuals is not the inevitable result of their 
handicapping condition, but, rather, arises out of the 
 
64 134 CONG. REC. S2399-02 (Mar. 17, 1988) (statement of Sen. Helms), 1988 WL 
1084657. 
65 See Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 6(b)(3), 102 Stat. 
1619, 1622 (1988) (codified as a note to 42 U.S.C. § 3602) (excluding coverage of 
“transvestites”); see also Kevin M. Barry, Disabilityqueer: Federal Disability Rights 
Protection or Transgender People, 16 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. J. 1, 15 n.62, 25 n.132 (2013) 
(discussing legislative history of Fair Housing Amendments Act); Colker, supra note 63, at 
39 (same). 
66 134 CONG. REC. S10,470 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1988) (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms) (on 
file with author). 
67 Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, § 6(b)(3) (excluding coverage of 
“transvestites”); 134 CONG. REC. S10,471 (noting 89-2 Senate vote in favor of amendment). 
68 134 CONG. REC. S10,470-71 (statement of Sen. Alan Cranston). 
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false perceptions and prejudices that others hold about 
individuals who have those conditions. The clear 
congressional intent was to sweep broadly—to change 
attitudinal barriers which had served so unfairly to 
deprive disabled persons of the rights and opportunities 




This amendment would single out one category of 
individuals who are already being discriminated against 
and say to them, “Sorry you now have no protections. 
Congress has decided that it no longer cares whether or 
not you are cast out of our society.”69 
The Helms amendment, Cranston concluded,  
could open the door to any number of attempts to 
exclude other disabilities from this and other 
antidiscrimination laws. . . . [T]he whole purpose of . . 
. antidiscrimination laws is to provide across-the-board, 
evenhanded protection, not to pick and choose 
disabilities we approve of and exclude the ones we 
don’t.70 
Senator Cranston’s insight proved prescient.  In 1989, during 
Senate debate on the ADA, Helms successfully proposed an identical 
amendment that excluded transgender-related medical conditions from 
the bill’s protections.71  William Armstrong, a conservative senator 
from Colorado, further proposed to exclude a broad list of mental 
health conditions.72  In negotiations over Armstrong’s amendment, the 
list was eventually whittled down to approximately eleven conditions, 
which included kleptomania, pyromania, and psychoactive substance 




71 42 U.S.C. § 12208 (2018); 135 CONG. REC. S10,776 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989), 1989 WL 
183216 (noting passage of amendment no. 716). 
72 135 CONG. REC. S10,753-54 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. William 
Armstrong), 1989 WL 183115; see also 135 CONG. REC. S11,175-76 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1989) 
(statement of Sen. William Armstrong), 1989 WL 183785 (discussing excluded conditions). 
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disorders, such as pedophilia, exhibitionism, and voyeurism; and three 
conditions associated with transgender people: transvestism, 
transsexualism, and gender identity disorders.73  Armstrong’s 
amendment, co-sponsored by Senator Orrin Hatch, passed the Senate 
and, with several modifications at conference, became law.74  Two 
years later, Congress passed an identical exclusion to the 
Rehabilitation Act.75 
As was the case with the exclusion of transgender-related 
conditions from Section 504 and the Fair Housing Act, legislative 
history reveals that the ADA’s exclusions were based on the moral 
opprobrium of several senior senators.  Senator Armstrong “could not 
imagine the [ADA’s] sponsors would want to provide a protected legal 
status” to people with mental health conditions that “might have a 
moral content to them.”76  According to Senator Helms, the ADA 
exclusions were needed because “moral standards” should allow 
employers to disfavor certain medical conditions.77  And Senator 
Warren Rudman characterized the excluded conditions as “socially 
unacceptable behavior” that “lacks any physiological basis.  In short, 
we are talking about behavior that is immoral, improper, or illegal and 
which individuals are engaging in of their own volition.”78 
By contrast, disability and lesbian-gay-bisexual rights activists 
had deep misgivings about the ADA exclusions, particularly its three 
transgender-related exclusions.  EEOC Commissioner Chai Feldblum, 
who was a staff attorney with the ACLU AIDS Project at the time, 
originally resisted negotiating with Armstrong and instead advised the 
bill’s sponsors to put Armstrong’s amendment to a vote, which she 
 
73 Barry, supra note 65, at 24 (discussing negotiation of Armstrong’s amendment). 
74 42 U.S.C. § 12211(b)(1); 135 CONG. REC. S10,785 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (noting 
passage of amendment no. 722).  The House of Representative’s version of excluded 
conditions explicitly characterized the three transgender-related conditions as “sexual 
behavior disorders,” inserted the words “not resulting from physical impairments” after 
“gender identity disorders,” and removed the exclusion of “current psychoactive substance-
induced organic mental disorders.”  H.R. REP. NO. 101-596, at 88 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 565, 597, 1990 WL 121679.  This version of excluded conditions was accepted 
at conference.  Id. 
75 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(F) (2018) ; H.R. REP. NO. 102-973, at 158 (1992), 1992 WL 322488 
(discussing amendment of Rehabilitation Act). 
76 135 CONG. REC. S10,734 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. William Armstrong). 
77 135 CONG. REC. S10,772 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms). 
78 135 CONG. REC. S10,796 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. Warren Rudman).  
This debate was eerily similar to the “moral standards” arguments subsequently made during 
the debate over the passage of DOMA and thereafter rejected as an acceptable basis for 
legislating by the Supreme Court in United States v. Windsor.  570 U.S. 744, 770-71 (2013). 
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predicted would fail handedly.79  When Senator Hatch demanded that 
Feldblum give him “more” conditions to add to the negotiated list, she 
reluctantly agreed.80  Similarly, Peri Jude Radecic, lobbyist for the 
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force at the time of the ADA’s 
passage, supported the ADA’s exclusion of homosexuality and 
bisexuality, but stated that, “as far as the other categories are 
concerned, I think that anytime that people are removed from 
protections, I don’t necessarily think that’s a good situation.  I’m not 
happy anyone is excluded from the bill.”81  And, according to Professor 
Bob Burgdorf, who drafted the original version of the ADA in 1988 as 
a staffer for (what was then known as) the National Council on the 
Handicapped, the ADA exclusions were “wholly inconsistent with the 
overall tenor of the Americans with Disabilities Act,” reflecting those 
“preconceived assumptions and stereotypes” that the ADA was 
intended to dismantle.82 
B. The Transgender Exclusion, the ADA 
Amendments Act, and the DSM-5: 1990–2014 
In the years following the ADA’s passage, several transgender 
litigants who experienced employment discrimination on the basis of 
gender identity disorder (GID) and transsexualism sought protection 
under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.  None were successful.  In each 
case, the district court ruled against the plaintiffs by invoking the 
transgender-related exclusions with little or no elaboration, and 
without reference to the constitutional dimensions of the exclusions—
including the moral animus underlying them.83 
Although the transgender-related exclusions effectively 
prevented transgender litigants from challenging disability 
discrimination under federal law for nearly three decades, disability 
discrimination challenges under state law have often been successful.  
 
79 Barry, supra note 65, at 23-25 (discussing legislative history of ADA’s transgender 
exclusion). 
80 Id. at 24. 
81 Katrina C. Rose, Where the Rubber Left the Road: The Use and Misuse of History in the 
Quest for The Federal Employment Non-Discrimination Act, 18 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 
397, 436 n.199 (2009). 
82 See Burgdorf Jr., supra note 12, at 452 & 519; see also id. at 519 (“[I]t is arguable that 
the members of Congress relied upon nothing other than their own negative reactions, fears 
and prejudices in fashioning the list of excluded classes.”). 
83 See Duffy, supra note 57, at 16-45 to 16-48 (discussing cases decided between 1994 and 
2004). 
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Approximately forty-three states have adopted disability 
antidiscrimination laws that track the ADA definition of disability 
virtually verbatim.84  Notably, only ten of these states have imported 
the ADA’s transgender exclusion.85  In the remaining forty states with 
no transgender exclusion in their disability antidiscrimination laws, a 
majority of courts and state agencies that have addressed the issue have 
held that GID and transsexualism are protected disabilities under state 
antidiscrimination laws.86  In 2001, in Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits,87 for 
example, the Superior Court of Massachusetts held that a transgender 
female high school student who was prohibited from wearing gender-
appropriate clothing to school stated a claim for disability 
discrimination under the Massachusetts constitution.88  Such a result, 
the court reasoned, reflected the Commonwealth of Massachusetts’ 
“proud and independent tradition in protecting the civil rights of its 
citizens”—particularly those with “traits that ma[k]e them 
misunderstood and despised.”89 
In 2008, Congress amended the ADA by abrogating a series of 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions that unduly narrowed the ADA’s 
definition of disability contrary to legislative intent.90  Specifically, 
through its findings, purposes, and revised definitions, the ADAAA 
rejected: the “demanding standard for qualifying as disabled” erected 
by the Court in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. 
Williams; the requirement of the Court in Sutton v. United Airlines, 
Inc. (and its companion cases) that courts consider the ameliorative 
effects of medication and other measures in assessing the limitations 
imposed by a medical condition; and Sutton’s narrowing of the ADA’s 
capacious third prong, which covers those “regarded as” having a 
 
84 Kevin M. Barry et al., A Bare Desire to Harm: Transgender People and the Equal 
Protection Clause, 57 B.C. L. REV. 507, 523 (2016). 
85 Id. 
86 See Duffy, supra note 57, at 16-111 to 16-124 (comparing favorable judicial and 
administrative decisions in Connecticut, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New York, and Washington, with adverse decisions in Iowa and Florida); see also id. at 16-
123 (discussing Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission’s January 2011 amicus brief in 
Stacy v. LSI Corp., which argued that Pennsylvania’s antidiscrimination law does not exclude 
gender identity disorders). 
87 No. 00-1060A, 2001 WL 36648072 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2001). 
88 See id. at *5. 
89 Id. 
90 See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12113). 
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disability.91  As clarified by the ADAAA, the ADA requires 
employers, state and local governments, and private businesses to 
reasonably accommodate a person with a medical condition that is 
actually limiting or that would be limiting, absent treatment.92  The 
ADA further prohibits employers, state and local governments, and 
private businesses from engaging in all other types of discrimination 
against a person with a real or perceived medical condition, regardless 
of whether the condition is or would be limiting.93  Importantly, 
because the Supreme Court has never interpreted the ADA’s 
transgender exclusion, the ADAAA did not address the exclusion—
much less remove it. 
In 2013, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) 
published the fifth edition of its authoritative treatise, the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), which replaced 
the diagnosis of “gender identity disorders” with “gender dysphoria.”94  
This replacement was more than semantic, reflecting a substantive 
difference between the medical conditions themselves.   
Unlike the outdated diagnosis of gender identity disorder, 
which the APA first introduced in the DSM in 1980, the hallmark or 
presenting feature of gender dysphoria is not a person’s gender 
identity.95  Rather, it is the clinically significant distress, termed 
dysphoria, that people experience as a result of the mismatch between 
a person’s gender identity and their assigned sex.96  Reflecting this 
distinction, the diagnostic criteria for gender dysphoria in the DSM-5 
are different than those for gender identity disorder.  For example, the 
criteria for gender dysphoria, unlike gender identity disorder, include 
a “posttransition specifier for people who are living full-time as the 
91 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (2018) (expanding “regarded as” prong); id. § 12102(4)(B) 
(citing ADAAA’s findings that, in turn, reject “demanding standard”); id. § 12102(4)(E) 
(determining disability without consideration of ameliorative effects of mitigating measures). 
92 See id. § 12201(h) (requiring showing of substantial limitation of major life activity in 
reasonable accommodation cases); id. § 12102(4)(E) (prohibiting consideration of 
ameliorative effects of mitigating measures in determining substantial limitation of major life 
activity). 
93 See id. § 12201(h) (requiring no showing of substantial limitation of major life activity 
in non-reasonable accommodation cases). 
94 DSM-5, supra note 45, at 452-53. 
95 See DSM-5, supra note 45, at 452-53, 814-15. 
96 See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, GENDER DYSPHORIA 2 (2013), 
https://www.psychiatry.org/File%20Library/Psychiatrists/Practice/DSM/APA_DSM-5-Gend 
er-Dysphoria.pdf (stating that gender identity disorder connoted “that the patient is 
‘disordered’”). 
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desired gender . . . modeled on the concept of full or partial 
remission.”97  Thus, there are people with gender dysphoria—namely, 
gender dysphoria posttransition—that would not meet the criteria for 
gender identity disorder because their distress associated with having 
a gender identity not typically associated with their assigned sex has 
been ameliorated by their having undergone gender transition.98  
Furthermore, the diagnosis of gender dysphoria in the DSM-5 rests 
upon a growing body of scientific research showing that gender 
dysphoria has a physical cause related to the interaction of the 
developing brain and sex hormones.99 
C. Challenging the Transgender Exclusion: 2014-2017 
In 2014, in the case of Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc.,100 a 
transgender woman diagnosed with gender dysphoria challenged 
workplace discrimination under Title VII and the ADA.101  When her 
employer moved to dismiss the ADA claim based on the ADA’s 
transgender exclusion in 2015, Ms. Blatt advanced three distinct 
theories for why the exclusions violated equal protection.102   
First, she argued that the exclusions should be subjected to 
heightened scrutiny because discrimination based on transgender 
status is a suspect/quasi-suspect classification under the Supreme 
Court’s four-factor test: transgender people have suffered a history of 
discrimination; transgender status does not affect a person’s ability to 
participate in society; it is a core aspect of a person’s identity, 
unchangeable, and impervious to external influences; and transgender 
97 DSM-5, supra note 45, at 814-15. 
98 See id. 
99 See id. at 457 (discussing possible genetic and physiological underpinnings of gender 
dysphoria); see also Duffy, supra note 47, at 16-72 to 16-74 & n.282 (citing numerous medical 
studies conducted in past eight years that “point in the direction of hormonal and genetic 
causes for the in utero development of gender dysphoria”); Second Statement of Interest of 
the United States at 5, Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-cv-4822-JFL, 2015 WL 9872493 
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2015) (discussing “the evolving scientific evidence suggesting that gender 
dysphoria may have a physical basis”). 
100 No. 5:14-cv-4822-JFL, 2017 WL 2178123 (E.D. Pa. May 18, 2017). 
101 See id. at *1-2. 
102 See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Partial Motion to 
Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 14-4822, 2015 
WL 1360179, at *17-39 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 2015), [hereinafter Blatt Br. in Opp’n].  For further 
discussion of the constitutional issues at issue in this case, see generally Barry et al., supra 
note 84. 
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people are a minority lacking political power.103  Significantly, Ms. 
Blatt was among the first to argue that discrimination based on 
transgender status constitutes a suspect/quasi-suspect classification.104  
She would not be the last, as demonstrated by recent litigation 
challenging the Trump administration’s ban on transgender service 
members and cases challenging transgender discrimination by 
states.105  Second, and relatedly, Ms. Blatt argued that the ADA’s 
exclusions should be subjected to heightened scrutiny because 
transgender discrimination is necessarily sex-based: it reflects sex 
stereotypes and is also based on a person’s change of sex or assigned 
sex at birth.106  Under either theory, Ms. Blatt argued, the exclusions 
failed heightened scrutiny because there was no compelling or 
 
103 See Blatt Br. in Opp’n, supra note 102, at 18-26; see also Barry et al., supra note 84, at 
550-67 (arguing that transgender discrimination is entitled to heightened scrutiny based on 
Supreme Court’s four-factor test). 
104 Prior to this time, equal protection challenges to transgender discrimination alleged that 
such discrimination was based on “sex” and was therefore entitled to intermediate scrutiny.  
See Barry et al., supra note 84, at 568 (discussing cases holding that transgender discrimination 
is sex discrimination in violation of equal protection). 
105 See, e.g., Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 208-09 (D.D.C. 2017), vacated by Doe 
2 v. Shanahan, No. 18-5257, 2019 WL 102309 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 4, 2019) (concluding that 
“transgender individuals . . . appear to satisfy the criteria of at least a quasi-suspect 
classification,” and applying “intermediate level of scrutiny” to President Trump’s transgender 
military ban because “discrimination on the basis of someone’s transgender identity is a quasi-
suspect form of classification that triggers heightened scrutiny”); Evancho v. Pine-Richland 
Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 3d 267, 288 (W.D. Pa. 2017) (concluding that “all of the indicia for 
the application of the heightened intermediate scrutiny standard are present” for transgender 
individuals, and applying “an intermediate standard of Equal Protection review” to school 
policy that prohibited students from using restroom consistent with their gender identity); 
accord Bd. of Educ. of the Highland Local Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 208 F. Supp. 3d 
850, 874 (S.D. Ohio 2016); Adkins v. City of N.Y., 143 F. Supp. 3d 134, 139-40 (S.D.N.Y. 
2015); see also Fabian v. Hosp. of Cent. Conn., 172 F. Supp. 3d 509, 524 n.8. (D. Conn. 2016). 
106 See Blatt Br. in Opp’n, supra note 102, at 28; see, e.g., Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker v. 
Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1051 (7th Cir. 2017) (applying 
“heightened review” because school district’s bathroom policy, which required transgender 
students to use the bathroom consistent with the sex listed on their birth certificates, was 
“inherently based upon a sex-classification”); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316, 1319 
(11th Cir. 2011) (affirming trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of transgender 
employee because “discriminating against someone on the basis of his or her gender non-
conformity constitutes sex-based discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause” and is 
therefore “subject to heightened scrutiny”); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 577 (6th 
Cir. 2004) (holding that transgender employee’s “claims of gender discrimination . . . easily 
constitute a claim of sex discrimination grounded in the Equal Protection Clause”); Doe 1, 
2017 WL 4873042, at *27-28 (applying “intermediate level of scrutiny” because transgender 
discrimination is “a form of discrimination on the basis of gender, which is itself subject to 
intermediate scrutiny”); see also Barry et al., supra note 84, at 567-73 (arguing that 
transgender discrimination is entitled to heightened scrutiny because it is sex-based). 
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important reason to exclude transgender people from the ADA’s 
protections.107 
Lastly, Ms. Blatt argued that the ADA’s transgender exclusion 
failed even the most deferential level of scrutiny—rational basis—
because it was rooted in moral animus against a disfavored group.108  
Such a bare desire to harm, she argued, cannot constitute a legitimate 
governmental interest.109 
In a detailed legal memorandum sent to Attorney General Eric 
Holder, six state and national transgender rights organizations urged 
DOJ to take the position that the ADA’s transgender exclusion was 
unconstitutional.110  The Blatt case “presents the right vehicle at the 
right time to challenge the constitutionality of the [ADA’s transgender 
exclusion],” the memorandum stated.111  “A quarter century after [the 
ADA’s] adoption,” the memorandum continued, “is long past the time 
for a court to strike this pernicious exclusion and clear the way for 
transgender people to enjoy the same protections under the law that 
other people with profound health conditions, whether stigmatized or 
not, currently enjoy.”112 
In an amicus brief filed two days later, these transgender rights 
organizations advanced an alternative, statutory argument: the court 
could avoid the constitutional issue by construing the ADA’s 
transgender exclusion to apply only to GID and not to gender 
dysphoria—a new and distinct diagnosis with physical roots.113   
In response to the Notice of Constitutional Question filed by 
Ms. Blatt pursuant to Rule 5.1 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the 
DOJ under Attorney General Loretta Lynch urged the court to avoid 
 
107 Blatt Br. in Opp’n, supra note 102, at 28-34. 
108 See id. at 34-39; see also supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text (discussing ADA’s 
legislative history). 
109 See Blatt Br. in Opp’n, supra note 102, at 35; see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 
634-35 (1996) (concluding that “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot 
constitute a legitimate governmental interest”—much less a compelling or important one) 
(quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (alteration in original)); 
Barry et al., supra note 84, at 574-77 (discussing transgender exclusion’s roots in moral 
animus). 
110 Memorandum from Jennifer Levi, Dir., Transgender Rights Project, Gay & Lesbian 
Advocates & Defs. et al., to Eric Holder, Jr., U.S. Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice et al. (Jan. 
21, 2015) [hereinafter Levi Memorandum] (on file with authors). 
111 Id. at 1. 
112 Id. at 5. 
113 See Brief of Amici Curiae Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders et al. in Opposition 
to Defendant’s Partial Motion to Dismiss at 11, Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-cv-
4822-JFL, 2015 WL 1322781 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 23, 2015). 
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addressing the constitutionality of the ADA’s GID exclusion by first 
resolving Ms. Blatt’s Title VII claims.114  When the court determined 
that the constitutional issue could not be avoided,115 DOJ filed a 
supplemental statement of interest on November 16, 2015 that reached 
the same result as amici, albeit by slightly different means.116  Gender 
dysphoria is not distinct from GID, DOJ argued, but emerging science 
indicates that gender dysphoria is a GID that results from a physical 
impairment (i.e., neurological, genetic, and/or hormonal sources) and, 
therefore, does not fall within the exclusions.117 
Over a year and a half later, on May 18, 2017, the court in Blatt 
denied Cabela’s motion to dismiss the ADA claim.118  Rather than 
adopting amici’s or DOJ’s statutory argument in favor of ADA 
coverage for gender dysphoria, the court settled on a third 
interpretation.  According to the court, “gender identity disorder,” as 
used in the ADA, refers simply to transgender identity (i.e., “the 
condition of identifying with a different gender”)—not to medical 
conditions like gender dysphoria that transgender people may have.119  
The ADA does not protect transgender identity (i.e., gender identity 
disorder), but it does protect gender dysphoria, which is a serious 
medical condition. 
On July 17, 2017, the U.S. Department of Justice under 
Attorney General Jeff Sessions filed a statement of interest in a 
separate case, Doe v. Arrisi, supporting coverage of gender dysphoria 
under the ADA.120  “[B]ecause Plaintiff has alleged that her GD 
 
114 Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 
5:14-CV-04822 (E.D. Pa. July. 21, 2015). 
115 Order, Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-CV-04822 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2015). 
116 Second Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, 
Inc., No. 5:14-CV-04822 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2015). 
117 Id. at 5 (“In light of the evolving scientific evidence suggesting that gender dysphoria 
may have a physical basis, along with the remedial nature of the ADA and the relevant 
statutory and regulatory provisions directing that the terms ‘disability’ and ‘physical 
impairment’ be read broadly, the [ADA’s exclusion of gender identity disorders not resulting 
from physical impairments] should be construed narrowly such that gender dysphoria falls 
outside its scope.”). 
118 Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-CV-04822, 2017 WL 2178123, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 
May 18, 2017).  For further discussion of this case, see generally Kevin Barry & Jennifer Levi, 
Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc. and a New Path for Transgender Rights, 127 YALE L.J.F. 373, 
385 (2017) (discussing Blatt’s holding). 
119 Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123; see also id. at *3 n.3 (likening “gender identity disorder” to 
“homosexual[ity] or bisexual[ity],” none of which are medical conditions covered by the 
ADA). 
120 Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Doe v. Arrisi, No. 3:16-cv-08640, 
at 2-3 (D.N.J. July 17, 2017) [hereinafter Arrisi Stat. of Int. of U.S.]. 
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resulted from a ‘physical impairment,’” DOJ stated, “by definition she 
has alleged that she falls within the statutory protections of the 
ADA.”121  Three months later, DOJ filed a nearly identical statement 
in yet another case, Doe v. Dzurenda.122  Notwithstanding multiple 
opportunities to reverse course in recent months, DOJ has not done so.  
Instead, for over three years, and under two separate administrations, 
DOJ has supported ADA coverage of gender dysphoria as a matter of 
statutory interpretation. 
Significantly, throughout this time, DOJ has never argued that 
Congress’s purported exclusion of gender dysphoria would be 
constitutional, nor has it articulated a legitimate purpose that could be 
advanced for its exclusion.123  On the contrary, when explicitly invited 
by courts to defend the constitutionality of the exclusion, DOJ 
expressly declined to do so.124  Tellingly, no defendant has attempted 
to defend the constitutionality of the ADA’s transgender exclusion 
either.125   
On December 8, 2017, transgender rights and disability rights 
advocates and lawyers, including those who identified as both 
transgender and having a disability, as well as those who identified as 
neither transgender nor having a disability, met in New York to discuss 
Blatt’s implications.126  The discussion was wide-ranging, but three 
broad themes emerged.   
The first was an acknowledgment of the importance of 
disability rights protection for gender dysphoria.  Like Senator Alan 
Cranston thirty years ago, some participants emphasized the 
 
121 Id. at 3. 
122 Statement of Interest of the United States of America, Doe v. Dzurenda, No. 3:16-CV-
1934, at 3 (D. Conn. Oct. 27, 2017). 
123 See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text (discussing DOJ’s intervention in 
support of ADA coverage of gender dysphoria). 
124 Compare, e.g., Order Certifying Constitutional Question to Attorney General of the 
United States, Doe v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 17-12255, at 1 (D. Mass. Feb. 28, 2018), with 
Notice by the United States of Decision Not to Intervene to Defend Constitutionality of a 
Federal Statute, Doe v. Mass., No. 17-12255, at 1 (D. Mass. May 30, 2018). 
125 See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s 
Motion For Preliminary Injunction, Doe v. Mass., No. 17-12255, at 18 (D. Mass. Feb. 21, 
2018) (“Defendants take no position on the constitutionality of the ADA and defer to the 
United States Attorney General’s position regarding the constitutionality of the federal 
statute.”). 
126 All references to discussions at the December 8, 2017 meeting are drawn from a 
memorandum on file with the authors, dated December 12, 2017, summarizing that meeting. 
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importance of equal access to civil rights laws.127  It would have been 
discriminatory for Congress to exclude Tay-Sachs Disease from the 
ADA out of animus toward Jewish people, or sickle cell anemia out of 
animus toward African American people.  So, too, with gender 
dysphoria; it was discriminatory for Congress to exclude various 
medical conditions associated with transgender people based on 
animus toward them.   
Other participants emphasized the importance of disability 
rights protection for gender dysphoria by noting the overlapping 
systems of oppression and shared experience of stigma among people 
with disabilities and transgender people.  For example, “ugly” laws 
once prohibited people with disabilities from participating in public 
life, while laws criminalizing cross-dressing did the same to 
transgender people.  Both groups have experienced a tragic history of 
forced medical treatment, such as compulsory sterilization of people 
with disabilities and the use of conversion therapy on transgender 
people.  People with disabilities continue to experience physically 
inaccessible restrooms, while discriminatory state bills advance laws 
that would prohibit transgender women from using women’s restrooms 
and transgender men from using men’s restrooms.  And both groups 
have experienced exclusion from service in the military based on 
treatable medical conditions.   
Still others noted the important gaps in antidiscrimination 
statutes that disability rights law can fill, including protection from 
discrimination in public accommodations, protection from 
discrimination in government facilities such as prisons, the 
requirement that employers provide reasonable accommodations such 
as medical leave or modified work schedules, and protection from 
associational discrimination.   
Several participants also noted objections raised by non-
transgender allies to disability rights coverage for gender dysphoria 
(e.g., “Why would you want to be protected by the ADA?”), and stated 
that these objections, while perhaps well-intentioned, reflected 
paternalism toward transgender people and prejudice toward people 
with disabilities. 
A second theme was a recognition that disability advocacy 
involves navigating contradictory disability models.  For example, in 
127 See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text (discussing Sen. Alan Cranston’s 
objections to Sen. Jesse Helm’s amendment to the Fair Housing Amendments Act). 
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order to obtain social security disability benefits, a person must 
advance a stigmatizing “medical model” of disability by arguing that 
the medical condition, itself, “disables” the person, rendering the 
person unable to work.  Under this model, which reflects the most 
common understanding of disability, the word “disability” connotes a 
medical condition that limits bodily functions.  By contrast, when 
invoking the protections of disability antidiscrimination laws like the 
ADA or Section 504, a person advances a more empowering “social 
model” of disability by arguing that one is able to work or eligible to 
receive a service in spite of a medical condition, but is “disabled” by 
others’ prejudicial, stereotypical, or neglectful attitudes and actions.  
Under the social model, “disability” connotes oppression, not an 
inability to function.  Participants noted that, although some disability 
laws rely on a stigmatizing definition of “disability” rooted in the 
medical model, laws like the ADA and Section 504 do not; they are 
instead premised on the social model and are vital to securing rights 
for people who experience discrimination based on a medical 
condition. 
One participant captured disability law’s contradictory models 
in the statement of a man living with HIV in the late 1990’s, at the time 
that Bragdon v. Abbott—which established ADA coverage of HIV—
was pending before the Supreme Court.128  “I have HIV,” the man said, 
“but I’m not disabled.”  What the man probably meant was that he was 
capable of working and was therefore not “disabled” for purposes of 
social security law.  But if he, like the plaintiff in Bragdon, were 
refused services by a dentist based on irrational fears about HIV, the 
man would have been “disabled”—and therefore protected from 
discrimination—under the ADA.  As with HIV, effective advocacy on 
behalf of people with gender dysphoria requires a thoughtful 
understanding of the promise and perils of both models of disability 
law. 
A third theme was a recognition of beneficial collaborations 
that have already taken place between disability rights and LGBT 
rights organizations (e.g., HIV/AIDS advocacy and, more recently, 
transgender autistic advocacy), and a commitment to further 
collaboration regarding disability rights coverage for gender dysphoria 
and other matters at the intersection of transgender and disability 
rights.  Notwithstanding perceived differences between disability and 
 
128 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
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transgender rights organizations (e.g., “LGBT groups have more 
money and greater success in the courts”; “Disability groups have 
bipartisan support and greater success in Congress”), the two groups 
have much in common, and the communities they serve overlap—
namely, transgender people with disabilities, who are among the most 
marginalized in our society. 
IV. THE FUTURE OF DISABILITY RIGHTS PROTECTIONS FOR 
TRANSGENDER PEOPLE 
As a result of the Blatt litigation, transgender litigants have 
challenged discrimination under the ADA and Section 504 in a broad 
range of settings.  At the time of this writing, there are at least fifteen 
pending or recently decided cases under the ADA and Section 504 
alleging discrimination based on gender dysphoria.  As depicted in the 
figure below, these cases are of three varieties—employment, prisoner 
rights, and insurance and identity documents—and loosely represent 
the three primary types of discrimination that people with disabilities 
typically experience: prejudice, stereotypes, and neglect.129 
 
In nearly every case, the defendant(s) invoked the ADA’s and/or 
Section 504’s transgender exclusion to dismiss the claim.130  A brief 
 
129 For illustrative purposes, the following groups of cases are organized around one of the 
three types of discrimination.  In reality, nearly all cases involve all three types of 
discrimination. 
130 Several defendants, including the United States in Doe v. United States, and Wal-Mart 
in Bost v. Sam’s East, Inc., did not invoke the transgender exclusion.  See, e.g., Defs.’ Br. 
Supp. Part’l Mot. Dismiss, Bost v. Sam’s East, No. 1:17-cv-1148, at 2 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 15, 
2018) [hereinafter Defs.’ Br., Sam’s East]; Fed’l Defs.’ Br. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 1, Doe v. 
U.S., No. 3:16-cv-0640 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2016).  In fact, in Bost v. Sam’s East, Inc., the 
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description of each case follows, together with noteworthy 
developments. 
A. Employment Discrimination 
The first type of case involves employment discrimination 
under Title I of the ADA.  In the following cases, transgender 
employees experienced daily insults and indignities on the job after 
undergoing transition.  These cases best illustrate the rank prejudice 
that transgender people often experience: offensive name-calling, 
intentional misgendering, denial of gender-appropriate services, and 
outright exclusion.  Because the ADA, unlike other civil rights laws, 
requires reasonable accommodations in the workplace, the potential 
impact of the following cases could be significant for employees with 
gender dysphoria—particularly, those who need to modify their work 
schedule or take leave to seek counseling, hormone therapy, 
electrolysis, surgery, or other treatment.131  
1. Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc.
In Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., Kate Lynn Blatt, a transgender 
woman, brought suit under the ADA after experiencing daily insults 
and indignities as a merchandise stocker at a popular sporting goods 
store.132  According to her complaint, coworkers at Cabela’s called her 
“he/she,” “fag,” “freak,” and other humiliating names, and store 
management refused the very modest accommodations she 
requested.133  Cabela’s would not issue her a female uniform or a 
nametag bearing her female name.134  It refused to allow her to use the 
female employee washroom and required her to use the single-person 
bathroom at the front of the store—after originally suggesting that she 
defendant, Wal-Mart, explicitly conceded that gender dysphoria is not excluded by the ADA.  
See Defs.’ Br., Sam’s East, supra, at 2 (distinguishing gender dysphoria from transsexualism 
and GID). 
131 See 42 U.S.C. 12111(9) (2018) (defining “reasonable accommodation” under ADA); see 
generally U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE:
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION AND UNDUE HARDSHIP UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT (2002), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html#leave 
(discussing types of reasonable accommodations under ADA). 
132 First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand ¶¶ 13-36, Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 
5:14-CV-04822 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2014).  Ms. Blatt also sued under Title VII.  Id. ¶ 2. 
133 Id. ¶¶ 16-18, 21, 26, 33. 
134 Id. ¶¶ 16-18, 32. 
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use the bathroom at a Dunkin Donuts across the street.135  Cabela’s also 
unfairly disciplined Ms. Blatt and, after just six months on the job, 
abruptly fired her.136   
Blatt settled in 2017 after the district court’s landmark decision 
holding that gender dysphoria is protected by the ADA.137 
2. Parker v. Strawser Construction, Inc.
In Parker v. Strawser Construction, Inc., Tracy Parker, a 
transgender woman who worked as a truck driver, sued her employer 
for violating the ADA.138  Like Ms. Blatt, Ms. Parker experienced 
relentless taunts from coworkers who mocked her appearance, stating 
that she “ma[d]e for an ugly woman.”139  Ms. Parker was also unfairly 
disciplined, denied access to a gender-appropriate bathroom, 
repeatedly misgendered (including in her termination letter), and 
sexually assaulted by coworkers and management who asked her to 
perform sexual favors.140   
On April 25, 2017, the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of Ohio dismissed the plaintiff’s ADA claim on grounds that 
“gender dysphoria . . . is expressly excluded from the definition of 
‘disability’” under the ADA.141  In reaching this result, the court 
rejected the holding of Blatt, finding “no support” for Blatt’s 
determination that the ADA protects “disabling” GIDs but not “non-
disabling” GIDs.142  The Parker court’s analysis of Blatt is mistaken.143 
Blatt did not say that some GIDs are “disabling” and protected, 
and other GIDs are “non-disabling” and excluded, as the Parker court 
135 Id. ¶¶ 19, 28-31. 
136 Id. ¶¶ 34-36. 
137 Blatt v. Cabela’s Retail, Inc., No. 5:14-cv-04822, 2017 WL 2178123, at *2-4 (E.D. Pa. 
2017); see also supra notes 100-19 and accompanying text (discussing Blatt). 
138 First Amended Complaint for Damages Jury Demand Endorsed Herein ¶¶ 34, 221-34, 
Parker v. Strawser Construction, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-541 (S.D. Ohio. July 17, 2017).  Ms. Parker 
also sued under Title VII and state law.  Id. ¶¶ 11, 13. 
139 Id. ¶¶ 58-60, 80-82. 
140 Id. ¶¶ 47-169. 
141 Parker v. Strawser Construction, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 3d 744, 753-54 (S.D. Ohio 2018) 
(“Congress intended to exclude from the ADA’s protection both disabling and non-disabling 
gender identity disorders that do not result from a physical impairment.”). 
142 Id. at 754. 
143 For a correct interpretation of the Blatt case, see generally Barry & Levi, supra note 118 
(discussing Blatt’s holding); see also supra notes and accompanying text (discussing Blatt). 
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suggested.144  Rather, Blatt said that gender dysphoria is different than 
GID: gender dysphoria refers to a medical condition that is protected, 
and GID—as used in the ADA—refers to transgender identity (not a 
medical condition) that is excluded.145  The Parker court reached the 
wrong result because it erroneously conflated gender dysphoria and 
GID; Blatt correctly determined that the two are not the same.  
Unfortunately, because the plaintiff in Parker did not plead that gender 
dysphoria results from a physical impairment, the plaintiff’s ADA 
claim could not survive under this alternative argument advanced by 
DOJ in other cases and adopted by the court in Doe v. Massachusetts 
Department of Correction (discussed below).146 
Because the Parker court did not dismiss the plaintiff’s federal 
and state sex discrimination claims, this case remains pending. 
3. EEOC v. Deluxe Financial Services, Inc.
In EEOC v. Deluxe Financial Services, Inc., the EEOC filed 
suit against one of the largest check printers in the U.S. for a broad 
range of discrimination against Britney Austin, a transgender 
employee.147  The defendant refused to permit Ms. Austin to use a 
gender-appropriate restroom, citing “consideration” of “other 
employees”; refused to change internal documents to reflect Ms. 
Austin’s correct name and sex designation; intentionally misgendered 
Ms. Austin; and made repeated, derogatory jokes and comments about 
Ms. Austin’s appearance, including calling her names like “Tarzan” 
(to tease her about her hairiness and clothes) and openly laughing at 
her at meetings.148 
Significantly, EEOC’s complaint alleged only sex 
discrimination.149  When the employee, Britney Austin, intervened in 
the lawsuit, she alleged disability discrimination as well, and also 
challenged, among other things, her employer’s maintenance of an 
144 See Parker, 307 F. Supp. 3d at 753. 
145 See Blatt, 2017 WL 2178123, at *2, 4 (construing “gender identity disorders” under the 
ADA “to refer to only the condition of identifying with a different gender,” and contrasting 
this term with the medical condition of “gender dysphoria”). 
146 See Parker, 307 F. Supp. 3d at 755; see also supra notes 99, 117, 120-22 and infra note 
174 and accompanying text. 
147 Complaint at 1, EEOC v. Deluxe Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 0:15-cv-02646, 2015 WL 
3636151 (D. Minn. June 4, 2015). 
148 Id. ¶¶ 33-73. 
149 Id. at 1. 
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insurance plan that explicitly excluded all transition-related medical 
care (including hormone therapy and gender confirmation surgery) for 
people diagnosed with gender dysphoria.150   
In January 2016, the case settled, with the defendant agreeing 
to pay Ms. Austin $115,000 and issue her a written apology, 
eliminating from its insurance plan all exclusions for transition-related 
medical care, and providing additional antidiscrimination training for 
employees.151 
4. Bost v. Sam’s East, Inc. 
In Bost v. Sam’s East, Inc., Charlene Bost, a transgender 
woman who worked at Sam’s Club (a subsidiary of Wal-Mart), sued 
her employer under the ADA after enduring seven years of horrific 
discrimination after transitioning on the job.152  According to her 
complaint, Ms. Bost regularly experienced derogatory comments (such 
as being called a “shim,” “thing,” and “faggot”), deliberate 
misgendering, unfair discipline, and, ultimately, retaliatory 
discharge.153   
Because Ms. Bost did not assert in her complaint that she 
presently had (or once had) gender dysphoria, her case is the first to 
allege discrimination based solely on being perceived as having gender 
dysphoria.154  People who transition are typically perceived as having 
gender dysphoria because transition is the recognized form of medical 
treatment for gender dysphoria.155 
Wal-Mart settled the case in June 2018.156  
 
150 Complaint in Intervention of Plaintiff/Intervenor Ms. Britney Austin at 1 & ¶¶ 103-113, 
EEOC v. Deluxe Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 0:15-cv-02646, 2015 WL 13283300 (D. Minn. Oct. 22, 
2015).  The plaintiff also brought suit under Title VII.  Id. ¶¶ 144-98. 
151 Press Release, U.S. Equal Opportunity Emp’t Comm’n, Deluxe Financial to Settle Sex 
Discrimination Suit on Behalf of Transgender Employee (Jan. 21, 2016), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/1-21-16.cfm. 
152 Amended Complaint ¶¶ 2-10, Bost v. Sam’s East, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-1148 (M.D.N.C. 
Apr. 5, 2018) [hereinafter Bost Complaint].  Ms. Bost also brought suit under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and state law.  Id. ¶ 1. 
153 Id. ¶ 80.  
154 Id. ¶¶ 5, 65. 
155 See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text (discussing transition). 
156 TLDEF Announces Settlement in Federal Lawsuit Against Sam’s East, Inc., and Wal-
Mart Associates, Inc., TRANSGENDER LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, http://transgenderlegal.org/h 
eadline_show.php?id=945 (last visited Feb. 26, 2019). 
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5. Schawe-Lane v. Amazon 
In Schawe-Lane v. Amazon, a transgender woman, Allegra 
Schawe-Lane, and her spouse, Dane Lane, a non-transgender man, 
filed suit after experiencing unrelenting discrimination during their 
employment at Amazon.157  As in Blatt, Parker, and Deluxe, Ms. 
Schawe-Lane experienced intentional misgendering and a range of 
epithets, such as “it,” “chick with a dick,” “shemale,” and “tranny 
prostitute.”158  This humiliating name-calling quickly progressed to 
intimidation and threats of physical violence.  While Ms. Schawe-Lane 
was using the women’s bathroom, a group of women entered.  One of 
the women loudly exclaimed, “It’s in here right now,” to which another 
responded, “Maybe we should just drag it outside the fucking stall.”159  
Ms. Schawe-Lane and Mr. Lane experienced similar threats from male 
co-workers, who yelled that they “should get fucking fired, faggots!” 
and should “get [their] ass beat.”160  Despite dozens of complaints to 
Human Resources and, ultimately, the EEOC, the abuse continued, 
culminating in a horrific incident involving someone tampering with 
their car in Amazon’s secure parking lot.161 
This case, which is the first to involve a claim of associational 
discrimination (against Mr. Lane) based on gender dysphoria, is 
pending. 
B. Prisoner Rights 
The second type of case involves discrimination in the prison 
context under Title II of the ADA and Section 504.  In the following 
cases, transgender people were denied access to proper medical care 
and gender-appropriate facilities and programs.  These cases highlight 
the pernicious, stereotypical attitudes that people with gender 
dysphoria often experience: discomfort with people with gender 
dysphoria, who are often seen as neither male nor female, but rather 
 
157 Complaint and Jury Demand ¶¶ 57-70, Schawe–Lane v. Amazon.com.KYDC LLC, No. 
2:17-cv-00134 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 9, 2017) [hereinafter Schawe-Lane Complaint].  The plaintiffs 
also brought suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Fair Labor Standards Act 
of 1938, and state law.  Id. ¶ 1. 
158 Id. ¶ 71. 
159 Id. ¶ 77.  
160 Id.  
161 Id. ¶¶ 99-109. 
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something in between—something less than human,162 and fear and 
distrust of people with gender dysphoria, who are seen as imposters 
trying to obtain an advantage through deception, iconoclasts trying to 
undermine community norms, or predators trying to harm others.163  
Because a disproportionate number of transgender people (one in six, 
by one study) have been sentenced to prison,164 and because sex 
discrimination statutes do not typically apply in prisons, the potential 
impact of prisoner rights litigation under the ADA and Section 504 is 
significant. 
1. Doe v. Massachusetts Department of 
Correction 
In Doe v. Massachusetts Department of Corrections, the 
plaintiff, a transgender woman who is currently serving a sentence of 
three to four years for a non-violent drug offense, sued the 
Massachusetts Department of Correction and several of its officials for 
incorrectly housing her in a men’s prison in violation of the ADA and 
Section 504.165  As a woman incarcerated in an all-male prison facility, 
the plaintiff faced serious, daily discrimination and degradation.  She 
was regularly subjected to dehumanizing strip searches by male 
correctional officers.166  She was forced to shower in view of male 
prisoners who inappropriately commented on her body and otherwise 
harassed her.167  Correctional officers and other staff at the facility 
refused to address or refer to the plaintiff using her correct name and 
female pronouns.168  And the defendants refused the plaintiff’s 
repeated requests to be transferred to a female corrections facility 
 
162 See Plaintiff Jane Doe’s Corrected Motion for Reconsideration of Order on Defendants’ 
Motion for Clarification, Doe v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:17-cv-12255, at 4 (D. Mass. Mar. 
21, 2018) [hereinafter Pl.’s Mot. for Recon.] (stating that “one of the most pernicious 
stereotypes about transgender people [is that they are] . . . neither male nor female”—they are 
“less than human[,] . . . an objectified ‘it’ rather than a person”). 
163 See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text (discussing examples of discrimination 
against people with gender dysphoria). 
164 Transgender Incarcerated People in Crisis, LAMBDA LEGAL, https://www.lambdalegal. 
org/know-your-rights/article/trans-incarcerated-people (last visited Feb. 26, 2019); see also 
Polices, Jails, Prisons, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, 
https://transequality.org/issues/police-jails-prisons (last visited Feb. 26, 2019). 
165 Complaint ¶¶ 1-8, Doe v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 17-12255 (D. Mass. Nov. 15, 2017) 
[hereinafter Doe v. Mass. Complaint] 
166 Id. ¶ 5.  
167 Id. 
168 Id. ¶ 65.  
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based not on an individualized assessment of actual risks, but rather on 
the apparent discomfort of female inmates and guards.169 
A group of disability rights, health and mental health law, and 
transgender rights organizations submitted an amicus brief in support 
of the plaintiff’s right to bring a claim under the ADA and Section 504, 
marking the first time that disability and transgender rights 
organizations have formally come together to advance ADA coverage 
of gender dysphoria.170  “Analysis of the legislative history and text of 
the ADA, as well as Supreme Court decisions interpreting the ADA 
and its predecessor, Section 504,” amici argued, “compels inclusion of 
people with gender dysphoria, who routinely experience 
discrimination based on stigma, prejudice, and ignorance.”171 
On March 5, 2018, in recognition of the daily harms inflicted 
on the plaintiff, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary 
injunction in part, ordering the defendants, where feasible, “to: (1) 
utilize female corrections officers when conducting strip searches of 
Doe; (2) to make permanent the arrangement permitting Doe to shower 
at different times than male inmates; and (3) to station a corrections 
officer as a privacy guard while Doe showered.”172 
On June 14, 2018, the court denied the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss.173  The court interpreted the ADA’s (and Section 504’s) 
transgender exclusion as not applying to gender dysphoria for two 
reasons: first, because gender dysphoria “may result from physical 
causes”174 (the theory originally advanced by DOJ); and, second, 
 
169 See Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff Jane Doe’s Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction, Doe v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 17-12255, at 1-2 (D. Mass. Feb. 26, 2018) 
(discussing “climate issues” among female inmates and objections from female guards). 
170 Brief of Amici Curiae Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law et al., Doe v. Mass. Dep’t 
of Corr., No. 1:17-cv-12255, at vii-ix (D. Mass. Feb. 27, 2018). 
171 Id. at 4. 
172 Doe v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 17-12255, 2018 WL 2994403 (D. Mass. June 14, 2018) 
(citing Order, Doe v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 17-12255, at 5 (D. Mass. Mar. 5, 2018)).  
173 Id. at *2.  In addition to the plaintiff’s ADA and Section 504 claims, the court allowed 
the plaintiff’s equal protection claim to proceed on grounds that the plaintiff had stated a claim 
that the DOC’s actions were “based on sex” and “therefore subject to heightened judicial 
scrutiny above the normal ‘rational basis’ test,” and were not “substantially related” to “an 
important governmental interest.”  Id. at *9-11.  The court also allowed the plaintiff’s due 
process claim to proceed on grounds that the plaintiff had stated a claim that she had 
experienced “an atypical and significant hardship . . . as compared to other inmates in the 
Massachusetts prison system” without due process.  Id. at *11-12. 
174 Id. at *6 (“While medical research in this area remains in its initial phases, Doe points 
to recent studies demonstrating that GD diagnoses have a physical etiology, namely hormonal 
and genetic drivers contributing to the in utero development of dysphoria.”). 
60 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 35 
because gender dysphoria “is not merely another term for ‘gender 
identity disorder,’” but is rather a distinct diagnosis with different 
diagnostic criteria175 (the theory originally advanced by amici in Blatt).  
This is the first time that a court has adopted either theory of coverage 
of gender dysphoria; the Blatt court reached the same result by 
different reasoning.176   
A contrary interpretation, the court concluded, may well violate 
equal protection.177  Invoking the “heightened judicial sensitivity” 
required for classifications of “discrete and insular minorities,” the 
court suggested that the ADA’s transgender exclusion was 
“constitutionally suspect.”178  According to the court: 
The pairing of gender identity disorders with conduct 
that is criminal or viewed by society as immoral or lewd 
raises a serious question as to the light in which the 
drafters of this exclusion viewed transgender 
persons.179 
Such an exclusion was particularly concerning, the court 
added, given the remedial purpose of the ADA, “which is to redress 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities based on antiquated 
or prejudicial conceptions of how they came to their station in life.”180  
In addition to other “firsts,” Doe v. Massachusetts Department of 
 
175 Id. (“In contrast to DSM-IV, which had defined ‘gender identity disorder’ as 
characterized by a ‘strong and persistent cross gender-identification’ and a ‘persistent 
discomfort’ with one’s sex or ‘sense of inappropriateness’ in a given gender role, the diagnosis 
of GD in DSM-V requires attendant disabling physical symptoms, in addition to 
manifestations of clinically significant emotional distress.”); see also id. (expressing 
agreement with plaintiff’s argument that “the decision to treat ‘Gender Dysphoria’ in DSM-V 
as a freestanding diagnosis is more than a semantic refinement.  Rather, it reflects an evolving 
re-evaluation by the medical community of transgender issues and the recognition that GD 
involves far more than a person’s gender identification.”); see also Jane Doe’s Opposition to 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Doe v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., No. 17-12255, at 13-14 (D. 
Mass. Feb. 2, 2018) (“Unlike the outdated diagnosis of gender identity disorder, the hallmark 
or presenting feature of Gender Dysphoria is not a person’s gender identity.  Rather, it is the 
clinically significant distress, termed dysphoria, that some people experience as a result of the 
mismatch between a person’s gender identity and their assigned sex.  Reflecting this 
distinction, the diagnostic criteria for Gender Dysphoria in the DSM-V are different than those 
for gender identity disorder.”). 
176 See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text (discussing Blatt decision). 
177 Mass. Dep’t of Corr., 2018 WL 2994403, at *7. 
178 Id. (citing footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938)). 
179 See id. (quoting Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 
559 (1896), for the proposition that “the Constitution, properly interpreted, ‘neither knows nor 
tolerates classes among citizens’”). 
180 Id. at *8. 
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Correction marks the first time that a court has addressed the 
constitutionality of the ADA’s transgender exclusion. 
Having determined that gender dysphoria is not excluded by 
the ADA and Section 504, the court went on to conclude that the 
plaintiff had stated a claim for disparate treatment, disparate impact, 
and failure to accommodate under the ADA and Section 504.  
“[U]nlike other female inmates, [the plaintiff] was assigned to a men’s 
prison by virtue of her gender assignment at birth and denied access to 
facilities and programs that would correspond with her gender 
identification,” thereby stating a claim for disparate treatment.181  
Additionally, “the DOC’s biological sex-based assignment policy has 
a disparate impact on inmates with GD because it injects them into a 
prison environment that is contrary to a critical aspect of their 
prescribed treatment (that they be allowed to live as, in Doe’s case, a 
woman).”182  Lastly, “Doe has adequately pled that she has been denied 
the reasonable accommodation of a transfer to a woman’s prison, as 
well as that she be addressed by prison personnel in a manner 
consistent with her gender identity.”183 
The court concluded its decision with a strong endorsement of 
the viability of the plaintiff’s claims: “As may be apparent from this 
decision, the court is of the view that Doe may very well prevail on her 
ADA [and Section 504] . . . claims.” 184  In September 2018, the DOC 
transferred the plaintiff to a woman’s correctional facility, marking the 
first time in history that a transgender woman was transferred from a 
men’s facility to a woman’s facility.185  Significantly, Massachusetts 
and Connecticut recently enacted laws that require this result.186 





184 Id. at *12. 
185 Michael Levenson, Transgender Inmate Moved to Women’s Prison, BOSTON GLOBE 
(Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2019/01/24/transgender-inmate-moved-
women-prison/Nf2k5Oqa3Ojnh1yH1IwWkL/story.html.  
186 See MASS. GEN. LAWS 127 § 32A (2018) (“A prisoner of a correctional institution, jail 
or house of correction that has a gender identity . . . that differs from the prisoner’s sex assigned 
at birth, with or without a diagnosis of gender dysphoria or any other physical or mental health 
diagnosis, shall be,” inter alia, “housed in a correctional facility with inmates with the same 
gender identity.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 18-81ii (2018) (“An inmate who has a birth certificate, 
passport or driver’s license that reflects his or her gender identity or who can meet established 
standards for obtaining such a document to confirm the inmate’s gender identity shall 
presumptively be placed in a correctional institution with inmates of the gender consistent with 
the inmate’s gender identity.”). 
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2. Doe v. Dzurenda 
In Doe v. Dzurenda, the plaintiff, a sixteen-year-old 
transgender girl who was in the care and custody of Connecticut’s 
Department of Children and Families (DCF), sued the Department for 
discrimination under the ADA and Section 504.187  According to the 
complaint, DCF placed her in solitary confinement for nearly three 
months at an adult woman’s prison—even though the plaintiff was 
never charged with or convicted of an adult crime.188  DCF eventually 
transferred the plaintiff to an appropriate facility for juvenile 
delinquent girls.189  Less than one month later, however, after a fight 
with several other girls, DCF transferred the plaintiff to a high-security 
facility for juvenile delinquent boys, where she was held in solitary 
confinement for seven more months.190  None of the other girls 
involved in the fight, all of whom were observed hitting each other and 
staff, were transferred or placed in solitary confinement.191 
As a result of her isolation, the plaintiff had no interaction with 
other youth and no access to age-appropriate mental health, 
educational, and rehabilitative services provided to other inmates.192  
In addition, staff members at the facility for delinquent boys routinely 
referred to the plaintiff using a male pronoun and her male given name, 
and refused to permit the plaintiff to express herself as a girl by 
wearing her own clothes, make-up, or a wig.193  Although DCF 
justified its extraordinary confinement of the plaintiff based on her 
purported dangerousness, DCF did not similarly confine other youth 
with histories of misbehavior and assaultive conduct.194  Indeed, the 
plaintiff was the only youth that DCF isolated alone in a unit for many 
months based on dangerousness.195 
 
187 Complaint at 1 & ¶ 1, Doe v. Dzurenda, No. 3:16-cv-01934 (D. Conn. Nov. 23, 2016) 
[hereinafter Dzurenda Complaint].  The plaintiff also brought suit under the Eighth 
Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment (due process), the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention Act, and the Prison Rape Elimination Act.  Id. ¶ 1. 
188 Id. ¶ 1. 
189 Id. ¶ 2.  
190 Id. ¶¶ 1, 93. 
191 Id. ¶ 94.  
192 Id. ¶¶ 2, 88.  
193 Id. ¶¶ 57, 101, 107. 
194 Id. ¶¶ 94, 107. 
195 Id. 
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At oral argument on September 19, 2017, counsel for the State 
of Connecticut appeared to concede that gender dysphoria was not 
excluded by the ADA.196  This case is pending. 
3. Edmo v. Idaho Dep’t of Correction 
In Edmo v. Idaho Department of Correction, Adree Edmo, an 
incarcerated transgender woman sued the Idaho Department of 
Corrections for discrimination in violation of the ADA and Section 
504.197  Prior to her incarceration, Ms. Edmo, who is Native American, 
lived as a woman and was recognized by her Tribe as “Two-Spirit,” a 
Native American concept encompassing cross-gender identifying and 
gender nonconforming individuals.198 
Approximately three months after her incarceration, Ms. Edmo 
was diagnosed with gender dysphoria by a doctor retained by the 
Department.199  Notwithstanding this diagnosis, the Department denied 
her access to appropriate medical treatment, including access to 
feminizing hormones, evaluation for sex affirming surgery, and being 
respected as a woman (for example, by having access to women’s 
clothing and commissary items) while incarcerated.200  Instead, the 
Department repeatedly punished Ms. Edmo for expressing her female 
gender identity, including subjecting her to solitary confinement.201  As 
a result of the Department’s failure to adequately treat her gender 
dysphoria, Ms. Edmo experienced severe symptoms related to this 
condition, tragically resulting in one suicide attempt and two attempts 
to self-castrate.202  The Department also refused Ms. Edmo’s requests 
to be transferred from her current unit—where she was sexually 
assaulted two years earlier, and which posed known risks to her 
safety—to protective custody.203 
 
196 See Minute Entry, Doe v. Dzurenda, No. 3:16-cv-01934 (D. Conn. Sept. 19, 2017) 
(noting oral argument on Defs.’ motion to dismiss). 
197 Second Amended Complaint ¶¶ 1-8, Edmo v. Idaho Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:17-cv-00151 
(D. Idaho Sept. 1, 2017), [hereinafter Edmo Complaint].  In addition to her disability 
discrimination claims, Ms. Edmo brought claims under the 8th Amendment, 14th Amendment 
(sex discrimination and disability discrimination in violation of equal protection), Affordable 
Care Act (sex discrimination), and state law.  Id. ¶ 7. 
198 Id. ¶¶ 37-38. 
199 Id. ¶ 40 
200 See id. ¶ 54.  
201 Id. ¶¶ 4-5.  
202 Id. ¶ 5.   
203 Id. ¶¶ 6, 57.  
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On June 7, 2018, the court denied, inter alia, the Department’s 
motion to dismiss Ms. Edmo’s ADA claim.204  Responding to the 
Department’s invocation of the ADA’s transgender exclusion, the 
court stated simply:  “[T]he issue of whether Edmo’s diagnosis falls 
under a specific exclusion of the ADA presents a genuine dispute of 
material fact in this case.  Therefore, Edmo’s ADA claim will not be 
dismissed.”205  Several months later, on December 13, 2018, the court 
granted Ms. Edmo’s motion for preliminary injunction on Eighth 
Amendment grounds and ordered the Department to provide Ms. 
Edmo “with adequate medical care, including gender confirmation 
surgery.”206 
This case is pending. 
4. Tate v. Wexford Health Services, Inc. 
In Tate v. Wexford Health Services, Inc., the plaintiff, a 
transgender woman with several medical diagnoses, including gender 
dysphoria, sued prison officials and the medical provider for the 
Illinois Department of Corrections for violating the ADA.207  Housed 
in various male correctional facilities, the plaintiff regularly 
experienced taunts and other harassment from corrections officers and 
inmates.208  Despite being raped and physically and sexually assaulted 
while incarcerated, the plaintiff was denied protective housing or 
transfer to housing with other women, and was instead forced to spend 
many hours in what was effectively solitary confinement.209  And, like 
the plaintiffs in Doe v. Massachusetts Department of Correction, 
Dzurenda, and Edmo, the plaintiff in Tate was denied access to 
appropriate treatment for her gender dysphoria, including medical 
evaluation for sex affirming surgery and equal treatment as a woman, 
including access to women’s clothing and commissary items.210 
This case is pending. 
 
204 Edmo v. Idaho Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:17-cv-00151-BLW, 2018 WL 2745898, at *10 (D. 
Idaho, June 7, 2018). 
205 Id. at *8. 
206 Edmo v. Idaho Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:17-cv-00151-BLW, 2018 WL 6571203, at *19 (D. 
Idaho Dec. 13, 2018). 
207 Plaintiff Carl Tate’s Third Amended Complaint ¶¶ 1, 18-27, Tate v. Wexford Health 
Servs., Inc., No. 3:16-cv-92 (S.D. Ill. June 19, 2018).  
208 Id. ¶¶ 19, 30-33. 
209 Id. ¶¶ 24, 29. 
210 Id. ¶¶ 35-49, 57-60. 
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5. Pro Se Prisoner Cases 
In addition to the above cases, all of which involve plaintiffs 
represented by counsel, several transgender prisoners have brought 
ADA challenges pro se.  Not surprisingly, the courts in these cases 
summarily concluded in a single sentence, without any analysis 
whatsoever, that gender dysphoria was excluded by the ADA.211  
Unlike Blatt, these decisions contained no analysis of whether the 
ADA’s transgender exclusion applies to the new diagnosis of gender 
dysphoria, nor whether the exclusion violates equal protection.212  
Furthermore, the courts that reached these decisions did not have the 
benefit of a statement of interest filed by DOJ, which concluded that 
gender dysphoria is not excluded from the ADA, or an amicus brief 
filed by state and national transgender rights organizations, which 
argued the same.213  For these reasons, the pro se prisoner decisions 
have little interpretive value. 
C. Insurance and Identity Documents 
The third type of case involves discrimination in the provision 
of insurance and identity documents under Titles II and III of the ADA 
and Section 504.  In the following cases, transgender people or their 
family members were provided with insurance plans that excluded 
coverage of transition-related medical care, and birth certificates that 
recorded “sex” based solely on the person’s original designation, 
thereby wrongly designating sex for transgender persons.  These cases 
well illustrate the society-wide neglect of transgender people, for 
whom society’s institutions were not designed, and whose health and 
safety society has systematically ignored.214  Because many insurance 
plans continue to deny coverage for transition-related care,215 and 
 
211 See Gulley-Fernandez v. Wis. Dep’t of Corr., No. 15-CV-995, 2015 WL 7777997, at *3 
(E.D. Wis. Dec. 1, 2015); In re Outman v. Annucci, 19 N.Y.S.3d 678, 684 (Sup. Ct. 2015). 
212 See supra notes 94-99, 102-09 and accompanying text (discussing arguments raised in 
Blatt). 
213 See supra notes 113, 116-17 and accompanying text (discussing DOJ statements of 
interest and amicus briefs supporting coverage of gender dysphoria). 
214 See supra Part II (discussing, inter alia, neglect of people with gender dysphoria); see 
also Feldblum, supra note 35, at 181-82 (discussing neglect of people with disabilities, Jewish 
people, and LGBT people). 
215 NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, THE REPORT OF THE 2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER 
SURVEY, supra note 51, at 2 (surveying 27,715 transgender people across the nation, and 
finding that “[o]ne in four (25%) respondents experienced a problem in the past year with their 
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because at least twenty states have laws that preclude many 
transgender people from securing accurate birth certificates,216 the 
potential impact of these cases is significant. 
1. Doe v. Arrisi 
In Doe v. Arrisi, the plaintiff, a transgender woman, challenged 
a New Jersey law that required proof of gender confirmation surgery 
in order to change the sex classification on her birth certificate.217  Like 
many people with gender dysphoria for whom such surgery is 
unnecessary, contraindicated, or infeasible, the plaintiff transitioned 
without surgery.218  As a result, the sex designation on her birth 
certificate is inaccurate.219  Although she was classified as “male” at 
birth, she is female, having undergone gender transition.  Specifically, 
she has undergone hormone therapy, which means that she has sex 
hormones circulating in her body that are comparable to those of a 
woman who was assigned the female sex at birth, and, as a result of 
such therapy, she has female secondary sex characteristics comparable 
to those of non-transgender women.220 
The consequences of such discrimination, plaintiff argued, are 
significant.  An inaccurate birth certificate discloses to all the world 
that the person is transgender and accordingly exposes that person to 
 
insurance related to being transgender, such as being denied coverage for care related to gender 
transition or being denied coverage for routine care because they were transgender. . . . More 
than half (55%) of those who sought coverage for transition-related surgery in the past year 
were denied, and 25% of those who sought coverage for hormones in the past year were 
denied.”). 
216 Changing Birth Certificate Sex Designations: State-By-State Guidelines, LAMBDA 
LEGAL, https://www.lambdalegal.org/know-your-rights/article/trans-changing-birth-certificat 
e-sex-designations (last updated Sept. 17, 2018) (collecting state statutes regarding changing 
sex designations on birth certificates). 
217 Amended Complaint ¶¶ 4, 15, 41, Doe v. Arrisi, No. 3:16-cv-08640 (D.N.J. Sept. 22, 
2017) [hereinafter Arrisi Complaint].  The plaintiff also brought suit under the Fourteenth 
Amendment (due process, and sex and disability discrimination in violation of equal 
protection), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.  Id. ¶ 15. 
218 Brief of Amici Curiae Bay Area Lawyers for Individual Freedom et al., Doe v. Arrisi, 
No. 3:16-cv-08640, at 2, 9 (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2017) [hereinafter Arrisi Amicus Brief]; see also 
Arrisi Complaint, supra note 217, ¶¶ 78, 88. 
219 Arrisi Amicus Brief, supra note 218, at 11; see also Arrisi Complaint, supra note 217, ¶ 
89. 
220 Arrisi Amicus Brief, supra note 218, at 11; see also Arrisi Complaint, supra note 217, ¶ 
57. 
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the risk of violence and other adverse treatment.221  To avoid such 
disclosure, some transgender people may seek invasive surgery that is 
not otherwise medically indicated or may even be contraindicated.222  
Such discrimination therefore places some individuals in a double 
bind:  transition without surgery and risk violence and other adverse 
treatment, or undergo invasive medical surgery that one otherwise 
would not need in order to avoid such risk.223   
Citing “a lengthy history of societal prejudice and neglect” 
shared by people with disabilities and transgender people, a group of 
transgender rights and health organizations filed an amicus brief 
supporting coverage of gender dysphoria under the ADA and Section 
504, generally, as well as the plaintiff’s right to amend her birth 
certificate without undergoing surgery, specifically.224  The amicus 
brief also advanced three separate theories for why the surgery 
requirement was discriminatory: it was intentionally discriminatory 
because it denied an accurate birth certificate to a subclass of people 
with gender dysphoria (disparate treatment); it was discriminatory in 
effect because it screened out a subclass of people with gender 
dysphoria from obtaining an accurate birth certificate (disparate 
impact); and the State of New Jersey failed to reasonably modify the 
surgery requirement for a subclass of people with gender dysphoria.225  
 
221 Arrisi Amicus Brief, supra note 218, at 13-14; see also Arrisi Complaint, supra note 
217, ¶¶ 14, 59-62; see also JAIME GRANT ET AL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 138, 154 (2011), https://issuu.com/translib 
eralprism/docs/ntds_report__full_228_pages (“Legal and bureaucratic barriers to amending 
transgender people’s identity documents marginalize and stigmatize transgender people. . . . 
Whenever people with incongruent identification documents must produce them, they are 
potentially revealed as transgender, whether to an employer, clerk, police officer, or airport 
personnel.  Each of these ‘outings’ presents the possibility for disrespect, harassment, 
discrimination or violence.”); accord Adkins v. City of N.Y., 143 F. Supp. 3d 134, 139 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“A mismatch between the gender indicated on the [birth certificate] and the 
gender of the holder calls down discrimination.”). 
222 Arrisi Amicus Brief, supra note 218, at 13-14; see also Arrisi Complaint, supra note 
217, ¶ 82. 
223 Arrisi Amicus Brief, supra note 220, at 14.  In recognition of the negative consequences 
of inaccurate birth certificates for people who do not need or undergo SRS, the American 
Medical Association has called for the “elimination of any requirement that individuals 
undergo gender affirmation surgery in order to change their sex designation on birth 
certificates and supports modernizing state vital statistics statutes to ensure accurate gender 
markers on birth certificates.”  AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CONFORMING BIRTH 
CERTIFICATE POLICIES TO CURRENT MEDICAL STANDARDS FOR TRANSGENDER PATIENTS H-
65.967 (2014), https://policysearch.amaassn.org/policyfinder/detail/transgender%20?uri=%2 
FAMADoc%2FHOD.xml-0-5096.xml. 
224 Arrisi Amicus Brief, supra note 218, at 4. 
225 Id. at 9-22. 
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Citing Justice Thurgood Marshall’s partial concurrence in Cleburne, 
amici argued that New Jersey’s surgery requirement represented a 
“case of what once was a ‘natural’ and ‘self-evident’ ordering” coming 
to be seen as “an artificial and invidious constraint on human potential 
and freedom.  Shifting cultural, political, and social patterns,” they 
argued, had made past practices “inconsistent with fundamental 
principles upon which American society rests.”226 
The State of New Jersey asserted that the surgery requirement 
was necessary to “ensur[e] accuracy in vital records and reduc[e] the 
likelihood that vital records are used for fraudulent purposes.”227  
Despite these assertions of necessity, on July 3, 2018, New Jersey 
Governor Phil Murphy signed legislation removing the requirement.228  
The previous governor, Governor Chris Christie, twice vetoed the 
legislation, calling it “beyond the pale.”229 
2. Doe v. United States 
In Doe v. United States, the parents of a transgender boy, one 
of whom was a colonel in the United States Armed Forces, sued the 
federal government and its health insurance program on behalf of their 
son for categorically denying coverage to service members and their 
families for “[a]ll services and supplies directly or indirectly related to 
transsexualism or such other conditions as gender dysphoria” in 
violation of Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (“Section 1557”).230  Section 1557 prohibits federally-funded 
health insurance programs from, among other things, engaging in 
disability discrimination prohibited by Section 504.231  According to 
the plaintiffs, the defendants’ categorical exclusion violated Section 
 
226 Id. at 2 (quoting City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432, 466 (U.S. 1985) (Marshall, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 
473 U.S. 432, 466 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Brown 
v. Bd. of Educ., which overturned Plessy v. Ferguson’s “separate but equal” doctrine). 
227 Brief on Behalf of Defendants in Support of their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended 
Complaint in Lieu of Answer, Doe v. Arrisi, No. 3:16-cv-08640, at 1 (D.N.J. Nov. 6, 2017). 
228 Alanna Vagianos, New Jersey Gov. Signs Bills Giving Transgender Residents More 
Rights, HUFFINGTON POST (July 4, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/new-jersey-
gov-signs-bills-transgender-rights_us_5b3cbee9e4b09e4a8b291569. 
229 See Arrisi Complaint, supra note 217, ¶ 91.  
230 Complaint ¶¶ 1-12, Doe v. United States, No. 3:16-cv-640 (S.D. Ill. June 14, 2016) 
[hereinafter Doe v. U.S. Complaint].   
231 Section 1557 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/civil-rights/for-individuals/section-1557/index.html 
(last updated Apr. 25, 2018). 
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1557 by denying coverage of puberty-blocking medications for the 
treatment of gender dysphoria while at the same time providing 
coverage of those same medications for the treatment of other 
conditions, such as prostate cancer and endometriosis.232 
Doe v. United States marked the first time that a plaintiff 
challenged the denial of insurance coverage for the treatment of gender 
dysphoria as “disability” discrimination under Section 1557.  As a 
result of a 2016 injunction in a case out of the Northern District of 
Texas,233 currently pending before the Fifth Circuit, the viability of 
challenging transgender discrimination as “sex” discrimination under 
Section 1557 remains in flux.  This case settled in February 2017. 
3. Manning v. McGettigan 
In Manning v. McGettigan, the plaintiff, a transgender man 
who was employed by the IRS, requested pre-authorization for chest 
surgery—a common surgery to treat gender dysphoria in transgender 
persons transitioning from female to male.234  Aetna, the federal 
employee health insurance carrier, denied pre-authorization on 
grounds that such surgery is an unnecessary, “cosmetic” procedure.235  
The plaintiff filed a complaint with the Office of Personnel 
Management, which is responsible for an insurance carrier’s denial of 
benefits, alleging, among other things, discrimination under Section 
504.236  Specifically, the plaintiff argued that Aetna’s exclusion of the 
procedure for people with gender dysphoria, but not for people with 
other diagnoses (including for cancer survivors), is discrimination 
based on disability.237  OPM dismissed the complaint, and the plaintiff 
 
232 Doe v. U.S. Complaint, supra note 230, ¶¶ 4-7, 84.  The plaintiff also alleged sex 
discrimination and associational discrimination under Section 1557, as well as violations of 
the Fifth Amendment (due process, and sex and disability discrimination in violation of equal 
protection).  Id. ¶ 12. 
233 On December 31, 2016, in Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell, the U.S. District Court 
for the Northern District of Texas enjoined enforcement of the Department of Health and 
Human Service’s regulation interpreting Section 1557’s prohibition on “sex” discrimination 
to include discrimination based on “gender identity.”  Section 1557 of the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act, supra note 231. 
234 Plaintiff’s Brief in Support of Notice of Appeal at 2, Manning v. OPM, No. 0120161068 
(E.E.O.C. Mar. 17, 2016). 
235 Id. at 2. 
236 Id. at 2 & n.3. 
237 Id. 
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appealed the denial to the EEOC.238  In response, OPM invoked 
Section 504’s transgender exclusion in support of dismissal of the 
plaintiff’s appeal.239 
On March 6, 2017, the EEOC reversed OPM’s dismissal and 
required OPM to process the plaintiff’s claim.240  Significantly, the 
EEOC rejected OPM’s argument that gender dysphoria is excluded 
from the ADA.  Instead, in a footnote to the decision, the EEOC 
determined that an individual who alleges that “gender dysphoria 
results from a physical impairment . . . states a claim” under the 
Rehabilitation Act.241  The EEOC’s determination in Manning is 
significant, given its decision in 1994, in Bell v. Shalala, dismissing a 
transgender federal employee’s disability discrimination claim based, 
in part, on Section 504’s exclusion of “transsexualism.”242 
4. Musgrove v. Board of Regents 
Similarly, in Musgrove v. Board of Regents of the University 
System of Georgia, the plaintiff, a transgender man who is employed 
by the University of Georgia, sued the University and its health and 
disability insurance carriers, Blue Cross Blue Shield and MetLife, for 
their refusal to cover the costs of his chest surgery and other gender 
dysphoria-related treatments in violation of the ADA and Section 
504.243  According to the plaintiff, the defendants’ exclusion of 
coverage of medically necessary and effective medical procedures for 
the treatment of gender dysphoria, while covering the same procedures 
for other diagnoses, reflected “the historical stigmatization of his 
medical condition.”244  Importantly, Musgrove is the first case to allege 
discrimination against insurers (under ADA Titles I and III and 
Section 504), in addition to employers (under ADA Titles I and II and 
 
238 Id. at 4. 
239 Manning v. McGettigan, E.E.O.C. App. No. 0120161068, at 4-5 n.3 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 6, 
2017). 
240 Id. at 5. 
241 Id. at 4-5 n.3.  
242 Bell v. Shalala, E.E.O.C. Appeal No. 01941146, 1994 WL 1755505, at *3 & n.3 
(E.E.O.C. Sept. 9, 1994) (citing EEOC’s ADA regulations excluding “transsexualism,” 29 
C.F.R. § 1630.3(d)(1)). 
243 Complaint for Damages ¶¶ 44-61, Musgrove v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 
No. 3:18-cv-00080 (M.D. Ga. June 28, 2018).  The plaintiff also brought suit under Title VII, 
Title IX, and the Fourteenth Amendment (disability, sex, and transgender status discrimination 
in violation of equal protection).  Id. ¶ 6. 
244 Id. ¶¶ 2, 44. 
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Section 504), for excluding coverage of treatments for gender 
dysphoria. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For over a quarter of a century, the ADA and its predecessor, 
Section 504, excluded transgender people from antidiscrimination 
protection based on disability.  While tearing down one “shameful wall 
of exclusion” for people with disabilities, these laws erected another—
denying transgender people the very “opportunity to blend fully and 
equally into the rich mosaic of the American mainstream” that was 
promised to others with stigmatized medical conditions.245  This 
Article has examined the shameful history of the ADA’s and Section 
504’s transgender exclusion, the advocacy that led to disability rights 
protection for gender dysphoria in a range of settings, and the impact 
these cases will have in redressing the prejudice, stereotypes, and 
societal neglect experienced by people with gender dysphoria. 
 
245 Remarks of President George Bush at the Signing of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, supra note 41. 
